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DISSENTING FROM THE BENCH: THE RHETORICAL
AND PERFORMATIVE ORAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
RUTH BADER GINSBURG AND ANTONIN SCALIA
Christine M. Venter*

At least one dissent per year is read aloud from the bench
by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. These occasions are often
among the most dramatic events of the Court's calendar, as
they feature a Justice speaking directly, and often
passionately, to an audience which includes her fellow
Justices. So, which cases tend to prompt these oral dissents,
and what are the Justices' rhetorical strategies when they
speak rather than just write their dissents? This Article will
explore the answers to these questions by examining the oral
dissents of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia from
the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. These
Justices were selected because they- were two of the most
prolific oral dissenters and because they embody starkly
contrasting judicial philosophies. The Article canvasses the
concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of
cases in which each Justice was more likely to orally dissent.
This Article argues that Scalia 's rhetoric evinces a view of the
law as "autonomous," operating independently of the facts of
the case and ignoring the impact of the law on the litigants.
He directed his dissents at the academy, perhaps in an effort
to create a conservative counter canon.
In contrast,
Ginsburg's feminist jurisprudence espouses a view of the law
as responsive to the facts and the need for social change. Her
oral dissents often targeted cases involving discrimination,
and she frequently spoke directly to those affected by unequal
treatment, having experienced such treatment herself.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

''[Law} is constitutive, for through its forms of language and of
life, the law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it
creates a set of actors and speakers and offers them possibilities
for meaningful speech and action that would not otherwise
exist; in so doing it establishes and maintains a community,
defined by its practices of language." 1

1. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM xiv (1994).
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On November 7, 2018, United States Supreme Court Associate
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg fell and broke three ribs. 2 The response
from her fanbase was swift and overwrought. People humorously
responded on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, offering to wrap her
in bubble wrap, or even donate their own ribs to her. 3 Ruth Bader
Ginsburg achieved such cult-like status that she had a rapper name,
a lookalike bobblehead doll, and she counted Stephen Colbert among
her fans. 4 Clips and memes of her doing push-ups and lifting weights
abound on the internet. 5 A movie, a documentary, and multiple books
have all celebrated her extraordinary contributions to the law and
introduced her to a broader audience. 6 There can be no doubt that
she has a place in popular culture.
This level of fame may seem odd given that many Americans are
unable to identify any Supreme Court Justice; 7 Ginsburg is one of the
few exceptions. Moreover, Ginsburg did not exactly shy away from
her fame but rather used it to draw attention to and amplify her
opinions, both informally and on the Court. She opined on the
number of women on the Supreme Court and penned scathing
dissents in several landmark cases. 8 Ginsburg even went so far as to

2. Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 85, Breaks
Ribs in Fall, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
11/08/supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-85-has-broken-her-ribs-in-afall.html. This Article was written prior to the death of Justice Ginsburg on
September 18, 2020.
3. Megan McCluskey, People Promptly Offer Bones of Their Own After Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Fractures Her Ribs, TIME (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:54 AM),
https://time.com/5449074/ruth-bader-ginsburg-broken-ribs/.
4. The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, Protect Ruth Bader Ginsburg at
All Costs, YouTuBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXN
r9kkquyQ (CBS television broadcast originally aired Nov. 9, 2018).
5. See, e.g., Valentina Zarya, If You Could Do as Many Push-Ups as Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, You Wouldn't Retire Either, FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2016, 11:45
AM), https://fortune.com/2016/09/22/ruth-bader-ginsburg-pushups/.
6. See, e.g., RBG (Betsy West and Julie Cohen 2018); lRIN CARMON & SHANA
KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG (2015);
ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018).
7. Chris Cillizza, Can You Name a Supreme Court Justice? You're in the
Minority, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/201 7/03/21/people-have-absolutely-no-clue-who-is-onthe-su preme-court/. The article claimed that only about 43 percent of likely
voters polled could name one Supreme Court Justice; meaning 57 percent oflikely
voters could not even name one. Most Justices were still unknown to that 43
percent of voters, with only Justice Ginsburg, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice
John Roberts reaching double digits in terms of percentage of voter knowledge.
8. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 739---72
(2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169-91
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In 2012 at the Tenth Circuit Bench & Bar
Conference at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Ginsburg was discussing
the status of women in the law and observed, "[n]ow the perception is, yes, women
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read several of these dissents aloud from the bench. Moreover, she
treated those bench dissents as performances, by donning her special
"dissenting collar" to signal to her audience what was to come.9
Although the practice of reading dissents aloud from the bench is
not new, it has become more pronounced in recent years.1°
Additionally, Ginsburg was not the only Justice to adopt this practice.
Justice Scalia, among others, was also known for reading his most
scathing dissents aloud relatively frequently and using his largerthan-life persona to expand his devoted following.1 1 While a divided
and more politically partisan Court may help explain why the practice
has become more common in recent years, 12 it does not fully account
for the phenomenon or answer the most basic questions: Why dissent,
and for whose benefit? In particular, what kinds of cases prompt a
Justice to dissent in this performative manner, and finally to whom
are they speaking, and what do they anticipate accomplishing with
these performances?

are here to stay .... And when I'm sometimes asked when will there be enough
[women on the Supreme Court] and I say when there are nine, people are
shocked .... [But no one] ever raised a question [when there were nine men]."
Ginsburg Wants to See All-Female Supreme Court, CBS (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:06
AM),
https://washington.cbslocal.corn/2012/11/27 /ginsburg-wants-to-see-allfemale-supreme-court/.
9. Kavitha George, The Powerful Meaning Behind Each One of RBG's
Collars, BUSTLE (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-do-ruth-baderginsburgs-collars-mean-each-one-has-a -special-story-9288551.
10. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court
Justices to Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560, 156EH>7 (2009). The
authors note that "[t]he reading of dissents from the bench [on the Roberts Court]
demonstrates disharmony on the Court ...." Id. at 1563. Suzanna Sherry has
suggested that the phenomenon of the Justices making their opinions through
dissenting opinions has become problematic because Justices are driven by
"aspirations of celebrity." See Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How
to Fix It), 106 IOWA L. REV. 181, 194 (2020). She asserts that the Court should
return to issuing its opinions per curiam. Id. at 197-200.
11. Scalia read approximately 7.9 percent of his dissenting opinions from the
bench while Ginsburg read about 10.6 percent of her dissenting opinions aloud
according to William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, "The Brooding Spirit of the
Law''.· Supreme Court Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J.,
no. 1, 2010, at 1, 6. Justice Breyer is also known for reading some of his dissents
aloud from the bench. Id. at 6. Scalia had a devoted following among
conservatives. See Jeffrey Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/
what-made-antonin-scalia-great/462837/. Rosen asserts, "[m]ore than any justice
since the liberal lion William Brennan, Scalia changed the way Americans debate
the Constitution, and for that he deserves great respect." Id.
12. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, SUP. CT. REV.,
2016, at 301, 302-04, 310-11, 314-20.
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This Article will attempt to answer those questions by closely
examining the dissents that have been read aloud from the bench by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia during the period from 2000
through 2019. 13 It will offer up several alternative explanations in an
effort to answer these questions but will start by positing two
important precepts: one, that the questions cannot be asked in a
vacuum without exploring the general role of dissent in our legal
system; and two, that there is something different about the
rhetorical situation when a Justice speaks from the bench as opposed
to authoring a written dissent. When one speaks one's opinion aloud,
it implies that a Justice is initiating a conversation, as opposed to
making a pronouncement. That conversation may not only be
directed at her fellow Justices for posterity but at other contemporary
audiences too.14
According to Mikhail Bakhtin, 15 speaking and writing imply an
audience or audiences that are ready to respond. Who are these
audiences, and what does the fact that the Justices are engaging in
oral conversation through dissents say about their view on the role of
the Court and the role of dissent in society? We generally see the role
of the Court as to "close what has been open" by deciding cases in an
authoritative manner.1 6 This Article argues that Justices who choose
to orally dissent are challenging that notion by suggesting that the
case is not necessarily closed and that even though one's fellow
Justices have not been persuaded, there are other receptive audiences
that might respond. Justice Ginsburg engaged in a discussion with

13. This period was chosen because at least one dissent was read orally from
the bench in each year of this period. Jill Duffy & Elizabeth Lambert, Dissents
from the Bench: A Compilation of Oral Dissents by U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
102 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 33---37 (2010). Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016, so
his dissents for the period 2000-2015 are canvassed.
14. It is generally accepted thatjudges use their dissents to "speak" to the
majority, among other audiences. Justice Ginsburg admitted as much when
asked about her audiences noting that "there is nothing better than an
impressive dissent to lead the author of the majority opinion to refine and clarify
her initial circulation." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). See generally M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim
to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, SUP. CT. REV., 2007, at 283--344 (examining the history of dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme
Court).
15. Mikhail Bakhtin espoused the view that just as the author had the
responsibility of creating an answerable discourse, so too was the listener
required to respond in some way. Bakhtin argued "[r]esponsive understanding
is a fundamental force, one that participates in the formulation of discourse, and
it is moreover an active understanding, one that discourse senses as resistance
or support enriching the discourse." M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION
280-81 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981).
16. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1545, 1564 (1990).
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the public when she chose to dissent, while Justice Scalia attempted
to cement his position in posterity when he dissented. The Article
will canvass the forms of rhetoric used by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg in their oral dissents and explore what motivated the
Justices to publicly become the faces of oral dissenting opinions.
Among these factors were their ideologies and a desire to send a
message to particular audiences. With respect to Justice Scalia, this
Article suggests that he had a desire to burnish his judicial reputation
and even to write dissents worthy of becoming "canonical." The
Article further suggests that Justice Ginsburg was much more
concerned with a more immediate response to her dissents, with
effecting change, and with engaging a broader audience. Because
Scalia and Ginsburg had very different judicial and political
philosophies and very different audiences, the cases on which they
chose to orally dissent help identify the motives behind these oral
performances.
This Article will proceed in five parts: Part II will first provide a
historical overview of the development of dissenting opinions,
describing how the Court moved from seriatim opinions to oral
dissents in the Dred Scott1 7 case. Part III will briefly canvass the
autonomous and responsive views of the law and suggest that those
legal philosophies are embodied by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg
respectively. Part IV will describe the methodology of the study
which examined the bench dissents of Justice Scalia during the period
from 2000 to 2015 and Justice Ginsburg's oral dissents from 2000 to
2019. Parts V and VI will provide a detailed multi-faceted analysis of
cases where Justices Scalia and Ginsburg orally dissented. In doing
so, these parts will discuss notions of rhetoric, audience, tone, and the
kinds of authorities on which the Justices relied to convince their
listeners. Part VII will conclude.

II. THE HISTORY, FuNCTION, AND PURPOSE OF DISSENT
Although current society has become relatively comfortable with
dissent, that was not always the case, particularly in the early years
of the republic. 18 Permitting dissent is, in effect, a statement that one
is confident enough that a young democracy can withstand what may
be perceived as threats to the legal order, where a court of final appeal
openly displays disagreement. Thus, in the early days of United
States legal history, dissenting opinions were not always welcomed,
as they signaled to the public a lack of consensus on the issue, which
might undermine the weight of the judgment.

17. 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857).
18. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 137, 137-38 (1999).
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The Historical Development of Dissents
In developing a judicial identity, the Supreme Court in the early
years of the founding of the United States looked to what it knew and
modeled itself after the High Court in the United Kingdom.1 9 Its
practice thus initially, in the first decade of its existence from 1790 to
1800, was to issue decisions seriatim, whereby all of the Justices
issued their own opinions and thereafter announced a short summary
of issues agreed on by the Justices. 20 The role of dissent was minimal
in these situations as the summaries sought to highlight what the
individual Justices had in common, in order to determine the opinion,
rather than issues on which they disagreed. Occasionally, too, the
Court during that period would issue a per curiam opinion. 21 Many
of these opinions were limited to cases where no reasoning or legal
analysis was attached to the opinion, and they essentially amounted
to merely an order. Hence, dissent was not a salient feature of the
Court in its early years. 22
During this period, the Court also initiated the practice of issuing
an opinion by the Chief Justice "for the Court," rather than by the
author of the opinion himself. 23 This was a practice that would later
be enthusiastically adopted by Chief Justice Marshall, whose
particular philosophy about the role of the Court was that it should
present a united front to endow the opinion with more authority. 24
He considered dissents anathema and fortunately had the personality
to bring the other Justices around to his way of thinking; per curiam
opinions thus became common during his tenure. 25
The practice of one Justice issuing an opinion "for the Court"
made sense given the time and context in which that practice
developed. For a new democracy that had thrown off the colonial yoke
and drafted a new constitution, it was important that the law be clear
and consistent. Unanimity, or what was shared in common, was more
important than the Justices' personal interpretations and differences.
In that spirit, a per curiam opinion was rarely challenged with a

A.

19. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of
Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 187-91 (1959).
20. See Henderson, supra note 14.
21. Kelsh, supra note 18, at 139-40.
22. Id. at 140.
23. Id. at 141-42 (noting that this practice attaches a significant amount of
weight to the opinion of one Justice, usually the Chief, which may give rise to
issues of doctrinal consistency).
24. Id. at 143-44.
25. See R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as an American Original: Some
Thoughts on Personality and Judicial Statesmanship, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1365,
1369, 1378-79 (2000) (noting that ''Marshall settled for a constitutional union
which would weather 'the various crises of human affairs,' as he put it in
McCulloch v. Marylancf').
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dissent; even concurrences were relatively rare. 26 For example, in his
concurrence in Sims v. Irvine, 27 Justice Iredell was at pains to point
out his general agreement with the Court, noting, "[t]hough I concur
with the other Judges of the Court in affirming the Judgment of the
Circuit Court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for affirmance,
I think it proper to state my opinion particularly."28
Thomas Jefferson strongly disliked the Court's new habit of
issuing one opinion on behalf of the Court and argued that judges
were shirking their responsibilities by moving away from seriatim
opinions. 29 However, Marshall was fairly successful at keeping both
seriatim opinions and dissents to a minimum. Todd Henderson notes
that it was not until 1804 that the first dissent was recorded after the
appointment of William Johnson to the Court. 30 It is no surprise that
Jefferson, a true Republican, had appointed Johnson, as their
philosophies regarding the role of judges coincided. 31 After Johnson's
appointment, dissents were occasionally issued; however, this was
not a frequent practice, largely due to the personality of Marshall,
who urged compromise during conferences and required all the
Justices to live in the same boarding house during the Court's term. 32
This practice forced the Justices to interact frequently both at the
Court and in the evenings when they dined together. They were thus
often able to resolve any disputes about cases that came before them
outside of the courtroom and out of the public eye. There were also
strong sociopolitical norms that frowned on dissent. For example, in
1898, the Albany Law Journal urged that "[t]here never should be a
dissenting opinion in a case decided by a court of last resort." 33 Its
rationale for this position was that "[n]o judge, lawyer or layman
should be permitted to weaken the force of the court's decision, which
all must accept as an unappealable finality."3 4
Henderson notes that "as factions developed within the Court,
the percent of cases with a dissenting opinion increased from four
percent under Marshall to nearly ten percent under his immediate
26. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 142-43.
27. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799).
28. Id. at 457 (Iredell, J., dissenting). See also Brown v. Md., 25 U.S. (12
Wheat) 419, 449 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (announcing his dissent "with
some reluctance, and very considerable diffidence").
29. Kelsh, supra note 18, at 145-46.
30. Henderson, supra note 14, at 317.
31. See id. at 317-18 (referring to "a series ofletters between Jefferson and
Johnson in 1822, [in which] the former urged the latter to dissent in nearly every
case"). Jefferson apparently did so in order to break Marshall's grip on the Court
and his practice of writing opinions for the Court. Id. at 318.
32. Id. at 313, 321.
33. Henry Wollman, The Stability of the Law - The Income Tax Case,
Address before the Greenwood Club, Kansas City, Mo. (1898), in 57 ALB. L.J. 74,
74 (1898).
34. Id.
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successors." 35 But to focus only on the low number of dissents and
laud the role of the Chief Justices in achieving that stated goal, is to
ignore the fact that dissents do not really threaten the unity of the
country or the fabric of democracy. It also undermines the importance
of dissents to a robust democracy. As Robert Ivie has noted,
"[d]emocracy exists only in the presence of dissent." 36 It was during
Marshall's successor Roger Taney's term as Chief Justice that one of
the Court's most impactful dissents was read aloud from the bench. 37
In fact, not just one but two dissents were read in the Dred Scott
case. 38 The entire process of announcing the opinion and reading the
dissents aloud took about five hours and began the tradition of oral
dissents that has prevailed for over two hundred years. Nowadays,
however, the Justices summarize their dissenting opinions when they
read them from the bench. These summaries themselves afford the
Ju_stices another opportunity to convey their opinions on the case, as
the Justices do not merely limit themselves to reading their opinions
aloud-they can use more colorful or colloquial language or choose to
emphasize certain parts of the dissent.

B.

The Dred Scott Case and Dissenting from the Bench
Dred Scott provides some insight into the multiple functions
served by oral dissents. Scholars generally concur that the dissent
proffered by Justice McLean was designed not only to express his
disagreement with the majority but, in large part, was designed to
preserve and advance his political aspirations-he wished to run for
president.39 Thus his dissent may have been designed in part to
enhance his status, be mentioned in the press, and thereby reach a
particular audience (potential voters).
McLean's dissent was
therefore more of a political statement than a measured insightful
legal analysis. It is not surprising, then, that it is often overshadowed
by Justice Curtis's dissent, as the latter comprised a methodical
rebuttal of each of the points raised by the majority. 40
Justice Curtis's dissent in the Dred Scott case is ranked among
the anti-canonical dissents, and it enjoyed a particular status even at
35. Henderson, supra note 14, at 321.
36. Robert Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 46, 49 (2015).
37. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 154 ("As a whole the Taney Court had a
higher non-unanimity rate than the Marshall Court (20% vs. 11%).").
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 529-64 (1857) (McLean, J.,
dissenting); id. at 564-633 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and
Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 564 (2009); William G. Ross,
Legal Scholarship Highlight: Presidential Ambitions of Supreme Court Justices,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 9, 2012, 12:39 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/
legal-scholarship-highlight-presidential-ambitions-of-supreme-court-justices/.
40. See Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis's Dissent in the Dred Scott Case:
An Interpretative Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 510 (1997).
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the time it was disseminated. 41 Abraham Lincoln was said to be so
inspired by Curtis's dissent that he kept a copy of the dissent in his
pocket and even specifically addressed it in a speech. 42 It was said to
have inspired the Republican party and the antislavery movement. 43
Even Taney, who took a counter position to Curtis, crafted his opinion
in response to Curtis's dissent, almost entirely overlooking
McLean's. 44 The press took note of this, reporting on the case as a
battle between Taney and Curtis and publishing those two opinions
in full, while summarizing the rest of the Court's. 45 Justice Curtis
appeared to be aware of the intense interest in the case, turning over
his dissent to a reporter shortly after delivering it, in contrast to
Justice Taney, who withheld his own opinion both from the Court and
eager reporters. 46 The intense interest in the Curtis dissent allowed
Justice Curtis to enhance his own status. This is an important benefit
that may be attained by dissenting from the bench that current
Justices are not unaware of.
Although the Dred Scott case commenced the practice of orally
dissenting, the practice did not take hold immediately. While the
number of separate opinions increased slightly after Marshall
resigned, the practice of unanimity dominated the Supreme Court for
over one hundred years. 47 That was in large part because of the
judicial philosophy of Taft who stated:
I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases
where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand
41. Richard Primus, Essay, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243, 256 n.48 (1998) (listing commentators who regard Justice Curtis's
dissent in Dred Scott as canonical). Not all scholars agree on the anti-canonical
or canonical status of Dred Scott. Id. at 256. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson
argue that there are "a baker's dozen reasons why Dred Scott continues to deserve
a central place in the canon of American constitutional law." Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
49, 49-50 (2007).
42. Streichler, supra note 40, at 510. In a speech on June 26, 1857, Lincoln
urged Americans not to accept the Dred Scott decision as settled precedent. He
stated, "[b]ut we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court
that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can
to have it to over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it." 2 Abraham Lincoln,
Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 398, 401 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/1/
lincoln/lincoln2/.
43. Paul Finkelman, Essay, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of
Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 36 (1996); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or
Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 61, 97 (2011).
44. See Streichler, supra note 40, at 516.
45. Id. at 511 n.16.
46. Ross E. Davis, Essay, The Last Word, 11 J. A.PP. PRAc. & PROCESS 229,
253-55 (2010).
47. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 174-78.
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by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record
my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain
than to have it settled either way. 48
Brandeis concurred with this approach, famously writing that
"[i]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled [...]
than that it be settled right." 49 He went on to note that ''he would join
opinions he disagreed with just for the sake of settling the law." 50
Norms against dissent, for example, were so prominent in the 1920s
that they were explicitly embraced in Canon 19 of the American Bar
Association's 1924 edition of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "It is of
high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should
use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and
the consequent influence of judicial decision." 51
That approach has not been the approach of the contemporary
Court regarding dissents. Moreover, the number of dissents read
from the bench also seems to have increased exponentially in recent
years. 52 Aside from the politically partisan confirmation hearings
that have produced a divided Court and that seem to have rendered
existing divisions more contentious, 53 there is more attention given to
the Court by the media, in part because it has recently been deciding
politically contentious cases. 54 Moreover, the audience for the Court
is more varied than in the Court's earlier existence. Robert Post
posits that "[t]he authority of our Supreme Court is different from

48. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 61 (1964).
49. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Ironically, Brandeis issued this statement while dissenting
himself.
50. Henderson, supra note 14, at 284.
51. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 19 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1924),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_resp
onsibility/pic_migrated/1924_canons.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
52. See Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7-8; cf Kelsh, supra note 18, at
17 4-78 (discussing the dramatic increase of the rate at which dissent was
expressed beginning in 1941).
53. Blake and Hacker refer to a "declining norm of consensus [which]
reflected the changing role of the Court in American life ... and was expressed
in the ideological differences among the justices ...." Blake & Hacker, supra
note 11, at 4.
54. The Court has recently decided, or will shortly be deciding, some
contentious cases involving the scope of executive power. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (separation of powers);
Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (the census citizenship
question); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (racial
gerrymandering); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (immigration). All of
these cases appeared in the headlines and attracted public attention. Moreover,
as Suzanna Sherry has argued, some of the justices seem to be cultivating a
celebrity-type public persona in part through dissenting in contentious cases. See
Sherry, supra note 10, at 185-93.
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that of the Taft Court because modern opinions now routinely engage
in an ongoing dialogue with American legal academia. Supreme
Court opinions both reflect and constitute the role of the Supreme
Court itself." 55 Moreover, since there is no serious question about the
Court's legitimacy, the Court does not need to present a united front,
and dissent is not seen as threatening the Court's stability. 56 This is
clearly illustrated by the relative lack of unanimous decisions in
Supreme Court cases during the 1990s,57 as compared to the Taft
Court, which tended to be more unified. 58

III.

AUTONOMOUS AND RESPONSIVE VIEWS OF THE LAW AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR DISSENTS

While it has become clear that Justices feel free to dissent in
cases on which they feel strongly, since society's tolerance for dissents
has risen, and dissents have even come to be valued by the academic
community as a means of providing insight into the Court's
deliberative process, these reasons do not fully explain why or in what
circumstances a Justice may choose to dissent from the bench.
Analyzing the facts and legal issues in the cases in which Justices
orally dissent and assessing those vis-a-vis the Justices' legal
philosophies and their views on the role of the Court may assist in
predicting the kinds of cases which prompt oral dissents. If Justices
view their roles and the role of the Court as being to articulate
established general legal principles to resolve not only the litigants'
legal issues but to clarify and maintain certainty in the law, then they
will likely dissent generally only when the majority appears to ignore
55. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice:
Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1275 (2001).
56. This may no longer hold true as Richard Fallon has suggested that
divisions over confirmations of Justices, like those occurring in Justice
Kavanaugh's confirmation, threaten the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 165-67
(2018).
57. Adam Feldman has noted that there was a 90 percent unanimity rate in
the 2013, 2016, and 2019 terms in respect to the first ten decisions of each term.
Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Amid Record-Breaking Consensus, the
Justices' Divisions Still Run Deep, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:28 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02/em pirical-scotus-amid-record-breakingconsensus-the-justices-divisions-still-run-deep/. Feldman has also asserted that
"[t]he court under Roberts (and Chief Justice William Rehnquist) steadily
increased the percentage of unanimous decisions across terms so that reaching a
level of unanimous decisions in orally argued cases of 50 percent is no longer an
anomalous occurrence." Id.
58. Post notes that "[o]fthe 1,554 full opinions announced by the Taft Court
during the 1921-1928 Terms, 84% were unanimous; of the 507 full opinions
announced by the Court during the 1993-1998 Terms, only 27% were
unanimous." Post, supra note 55, at 1283.
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or misstate the rules. This would align with the view that the Court's
role is to '"sufficiently ... elaborate the principles, ... to make the
discussion of those principles and the conclusion reached useful to the
country and to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of
constitutional and fundamental law."'59 If however, a Justice's
judicial philosophy predisposes her to be more responsive to the facts
and context of cases, she may be more likely to dissent in cases with
hard facts or cases which expose deep societal issues.
However, while some may argue that Justices also dissent for
personal philosophical and jurisprudential reasons, these reasons
usually align with or are related to the respective Justice's views on
the role of the Court and on the role oflaw in society generally. Robert
Post has identified two primary views of the role of the Court and the
role oflaw; he ascribes to Nonet and Selznick's terminology, referring
to these views as the autonomous view and the responsive view.60
Post describes the autonomous view as asserting that "[t]he task of
the judiciary is to maintain fidelity to a system of certain and definite
rules, even at the cost of 'the adaptation oflaw to social facts."' 61 This
view seeks to use precedent in such a way so as to create a sense of
the inevitability of the outcome. 62 Rules, principles, and authority are
all important, and the particular facts of the case are less so. One
may identify a Justice's affiliation with the autonomous view by
closely analyzing both the rhetoric and analytical methodology of that
Justice's opinions. As Burke and others have pointed out, in crafting
judicial opinions, judges who subscribe to the autonomous view speak
with authority, finality, and even a sense of inevitability. 63 They
consider opposing arguments and address those by distinguishing the
authority cited by the losing side. They give short shrift to facts and
focus almost entirely on the law. This all contributes to the sense of
inevitability and certainty that is commonly found in these types of
judicial opinions. Robert Ferguson points out how "[t]he monologic
voice, the interrogative mode, and the declarative tone build together
in what might be called a rhetoric of inevitability."6 4 Justices who
favor this approach use precedent in such a way that a particular
59. Id. at 1304 (footnote omitted).
60. See id. at 1381-82.
61. Id. at 1381 (footnote omitted); see also PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP
SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 64
(Transaction Publishers 2001) (1978).
62. See Post, supra note 55, at 1381-82.
63. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, PRACTICE EXTENDED: BEYOND LAW AND
LITERATURE 126 (2016) (quoting KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 25859, 379-80 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1969) (1945)) ("Burke sees
present and future things in terms of a now fixed past; legal precedents establish
just such a relationship by creating an 'immutable scene ... of "eternal truth,
equity, and justice.""').
64. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMANS. 201, 213 (1990).
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outcome seems a foregone conclusion, despite the fact that most cases
that reach the Supreme Court do so because there are circuit splits;
there are strongly contested and often polarized views of what the law
is or ought to be; or, there are important policy considerations at
stake.65 Moreover, Justices who ascribe to the autonomous view tend
not to be moved by the facts of the case before them or any sociological
or extralegal forms of authority. Their opinions may be identified by
a commitment to textualism, originalism, and strict use of
precedent. 66
If, however, a Justice believes that the law should be responsive
to social change and should evolve to take into account changing
social circumstances or the facts of a particular case, that Justice's
view of the law may be described as responsive. Philippe Nonet and
Philip Selznick describe this approach as requiring the law to assume
an "openness and flexibility" that does not comport with strict rulebound decision making.6 7 Under the responsive model, the results of
a case may be less predictable as it becomes "more difficult to
distinguish legal analysis from policy analysis, legal rationality from
other forms of systematic decision making." 68 Judges who subscribe
to this approach are more keenly aware of social forces and are more
likely to be persuaded by policy and factual arguments. They will
likely refer to the facts more directly in their opinions. This approach
appears to be favored by Justice Ginsburg, who has shown herself to
be attuned to social change, particularly the changing roles of women
in society and the discrimination that persists despite those changes.
Post has pointed out that when lawyers cease to understand the law
as "a grid of fixed and certain principles designed for the settlement
of disputes" and come instead to understand it as "the site of ongoing
processes of adjustment and statesmanship designed to achieve social
purposes,"69 then dissents may be used as part of an ongoing societal
conversation about the appropriate course of action in achieving those
purposes.
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES, COGNITIVE CLARITY, AND THE
ORAL DISSENTS OF JUSTICES SCALIA AND GINSBURG

Whether Justices ascribe to the autonomous or responsive
approach has significant implications for the ways in which they write
their opinions or dissents, the audiences they seek to persuade, the
authorities on which they rely, and the rhetorical choices that they
make in choosing what to emphasize and de-emphasize in their
opinions. H.L.A. Hart once asserted that dissenting opinions "have

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 213-16.
See Post, supra note 55, at 1381-82.
NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 61, at 78.
Id. at 83.
Post, supra note 55, at 1274.
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no consequences within the system ... because no one's rights or
duties are altered thereby." 70 However, that assertion only stands if
the "system" is "defined narrowly as the set oflegal rules and not the
institutions through which law is pronounced and through which it
acquires social legitimacy." 71 More recently, dissent has come to be
seen as a healthy component of democracy, as a challenge to the
monologic voice of the majority opinion, and as a more democratizing
form of judicial speech that engages an audience and invites a
response. 72
Dissenting has become a well-established practice of the Court,
in contrast to earlier years when the practice was frowned upon. 73
Indeed Justice Douglas wrote that:
The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable
for a judge of an appellate court ... the affairs of government
could not be conducted by democratic standards without
it.... It is the right of dissent, not the right or duty to conform,
which gives dignity, worth, and individuality to man. 74
Nowadays, dissents offer a space for the dissenting Justice to
advance alternative interpretations of the law. As Guinier has
pointed out, oral dissents may provide opportunities for
"instantiating and reinforcing the relationship between public
engagement and institutional legitimacy." 75 Because Justices Scalia
70. H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (3d ed. 2012).
71. Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century
Lawyers and the Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALEJ. L. & HUMANS. 507,533 (2012).
72. Lani Guinier, Beyond Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change,
and the Possibilities of Demosprudence-Courting the People: Demosprudence
and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2009) [hereinafter Guinier,
Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide].
Guinier asserts that
''Demosprudence is a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence.
It describes
lawmaking or legal practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the
people. Demosprudence, unlike traditional jurisprudence, is not concerned
primarily with the logical reasoning or legal principles that animate and justify
a judicial opinion. Demosprudence is instead focused on enhancing the
democratic potential of the work of lawyers, judges, and other legal elites.
Demosprudence through dissent attempts to understand the democracyenhancing potential implicit and explicit in the practice of dissents." Lani
Guinier, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term: Demosprudence Through
Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15---16 (2008) [hereinafter Guinier, Demosprudence
Through Dissent].
73. See, e.g., Post supra note 55, at 1283 (asserting that in the Court's early
years there were norms and established institutional practices that operated
against dissent. Those norms and practice are no longer in place and dissenting
opinions have become relatively routine). See also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm
of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 365 (2001).
7 4. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4-5 (1960).
75. Guinier, Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, supra note 72, at
544.
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and Ginsburg were so well-known and had such a popular following,
and because of the strongly-worded rhetoric of their dissents, they
created rhetorical spaces for their respective audiences to engage with
them on the issues before the Court. 76 By speaking, and not just
writing their dissents, they engaged with and demanded a response
from their audiences in a way that written dissents did not.
A limited amount of research on oral dissents has been
conducted. While they may be reported on in the popular press, until
recently there has been no readily accessible database of bench
dissents. 77 The practice of the Court is for the Chief Justice to
announce who will deliver a summary of an opinion being handed
down in a particular case; then, the Chief Justice will announce if
there is to be an oral dissent and advise the onlookers who will deliver
it. 78 In reading a dissent from the bench, a Justice may choose how
much of the dissent to read, and whether or how to paraphrase it. My
research shows that a Justice typically spends between five and
twenty minutes reading his or her dissent. 79 The wording and
organization of the oral dissent typically very closely track that of the
written dissent, but the sentences used tend to be shorter and
therefore are easier to understand and follow. Unlike in their
published dissents, the Justices tend not to cite to authority in
support of their assertions, unless it is to extremely well-known
authority. This makes spoken dissents more accessible to the public
and press.
This following Subpart will analyze the oral dissents of Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg during the period from 2000 to 2019 80 and
examine the subject matter, audiences, and rhetoric of their dissents.
These two Justices were chosen for a number of reasons, not least of
which is that they engaged in the practice of oral dissent at a much
76. LoRRAINE CODE & ROBERT AYSON, RHETORICAL SPACES: ESSAYS ON
GENDERED LoCATIONS ix (1995) (describing rhetorical spaces as fictive places
which "structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within them
with a reasonable expectation of uptake and 'choral support"'). Lloyd Bitzer
concurs, noting the rhetorical situation is "a natural context of persons, events,
objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance." Lloyd F.
Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 4 (1968).
77. In 2009, Jill Duffy and Elizabeth Lambert compiled a list of Supreme
Court oral dissents which they have now begun updating. See Duffy & Lambert,
supra note 13, at 23. Oral dissents are also available under each case on the
Supreme Court website.
See OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/.
A written
transcription of the oral dissent is also available there, but there are often errors
in the transcriptions. Id.
78. Duffy & Lambert, supra note 13, at 7-8.
79. See, e.g., infra Subpart IV.A.
80. Oral dissents were analyzed from 2000---2015 in the case of Justice Scalia
because of his death on February 13, 2016. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice
on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www .nytimes.com/2016/02/ 14/us/antonin-scalia -death.html.
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higher rate than their fellow Justices.
Justice Scalia read
approximately 7.9 percent of the dissents he authored from the
bench. 81 Justice Ginsburg read around 10.6 percent of her dissents
from the bench. 82 Moreover, these two Justices embody the two
disparate approaches of an autonomous view and a responsive view
of the law respectively, as well as having different jurisprudential
ideologies (conservative versus liberal). This Article asserts that a
Justice will usually choose to orally dissent primarily on ideological
grounds and usually when she believes that the majority has reached
so profoundly a wrong conclusion that a written dissent will not
suffice. 83 Moreover, this Article posits that dissenting orally attracts
more press attention and thus communicates the Justice's position to
a broader audience whom she seeks to engage in dialogue over the
issue. The Article argues that Justices use their popular personas to
garner attention for the dissents, and that in doing so, the Justices
begin a conversation about the issue that may result in legislative or
policy changes.
A.

Data and Methodology of the Study
The following Subparts will analyze the legal issues, facts, and
authorities relied on, as well as potential policy considerations for
dissenting, in the most recent oral dissents of Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg. The Justices' rhetoric will also be explored, including their
likely intended audiences, the tone of the dissents, and whether their
judicial philosophies are communicated through their rhetoric. The
tables attached as Appendices A and B categorize the types of cases
in which each Justice dissented and rank the readability scores of
those cases. 84 The underlying hypothesis of this study was that
Justice Scalia would orally dissent in cases involving an
interpretation of the Constitution that departed from originalism or
in statutory cases where, in his opinion, the Court was departing from
the plain meaning of the text. It was further anticipated that Justice
Ginsburg would dissent in cases where the Court failed to recognize
discrimination in its various guises, or where the Court ignored the
factual realities of the litigants and the impact of the Court's decision
on those litigants. These hypotheses were ultimately supported by
the data. Moreover, a Justice was most likely to read a dissent from
the bench when the Court was split 5:4. Justice Scalia dissented in

81. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7.
82. Id.
83. See generally Johnson et al., supra note 10 (establishing such premise).
84. The readability levels were evaluated using The Flesch Kincaid Grade
reading level, the Gunning Fog scale, the Cole Liau Index and the SMOG scale.
The Flesh Kincaid Grade reading level takes the most factors into account, so the
analysis primarily relied on that score. Details about how the other scales
evaluate the readability of the dissents is contained in the attached Appendices.
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three cases out of fourteen in which there was not a 5:4 split. 85 Justice
Ginsburg similarly dissented in three cases in which there was not a
5:4 split.86
The methodology for the analysis was as follows:
1. The legal issues were briefly analyzed in each case to
determine if there was any predictable or common pattern in the
types of cases in which Ginsburg and Scalia chose to orally dissent.
2. The oral dissents were then analyzed according to their
cognitive and rhetorical complexities using Flesch Kincaid and other
reading scales8 7 to determine the readability level of these texts and
ascertain whom the Justices might be inviting to engage in dialogue
with them about the cases. Potential audiences for the dissents were
canvassed, including information that Justices themselves provided
about their audiences. While programs that measure reading ease
and complexity like the Flesch Kincaid scale are not dispositive in
respect of audiences, given that legal opinions are often inherently
complex and difficult to read due to legal terminology and subject
matter, any significant difference between the levels of complexity
between the Justices may nevertheless shed some light on their
audiences. Another limitation of using reading complexity is that
these formulae do not measure cognitive clarity. Owens and
Wedeking's concept of cognitive clarity were thus also canvassed.
3. The types of authorities and sources on which each Justice
relied in the dissents were evaluated to ascertain if there is a
predictability or pattern to the authorities on which dissenting
Justices rely.

85. The three cases in which Justice Scalia dissented were King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 4 73, 498-518 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the constitutionality of the
ACA); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(the constitutionality of Texas's anti-sodomy laws); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (whether mentally disabled people
should be excluded from the death penalty).
86. Ginsburg dissented in American Legion v. American Humanist
Association, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103-13 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a First
Amendment case); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893914 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a jurisdiction case); and Cheney v. U.S.
District Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 396-405 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a
separation of powers case).
87. "A reading difficulty[, or readability,] measure can be described as a
function or model that maps a text to a numerical value corresponding to a
difficulty or grade level." See Michael Heilman et al., An Analysis of Statistical
Models and Features for Reading Difficulty Prediction, in EANL '08:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORKSHOP ON INNOVATIVE USE OF NLP FOR BUILDING
EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS 71, 71 (Ass'n Computational Linguistics ed., 2008).
The Flesch Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and other similar measures are
examples of such scales.
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4. The dissents were then subjected to a rhetorical analysis to
evaluate the Justices' language, tone, and the figures of speech used.
The analysis revealed the following general results: Justice
Scalia's dissents were unsurprisingly overwhelmingly issued in cases
involving constitutional issues or textual questions involving issues
of statutory interpretation. This is consistent with his judicial
preferences for originalism, textualism, and federalism. However, his
ideological preferences were also clearly indicated in his oral dissents,
as his more vituperative rhetoric was reserved for cases involving
LGBTQ rights, the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), and the death
penalty. His dissents required a slightly more sophisticated reading
level than Justice Ginsburg's 88 but were cognitively clearer than hers,
at least according to Owens and Wedeking's scale. 89 Scalia relied
almost exclusively on the Constitution itself, the writings of the
Framers, the statute in question, or on precedent as authority for his
decisions.9° In his dissents Scalia often specifically decried relying on
sociological authority or taking any exigent factual circumstances or
policy into account. He addressed the majority directly on multiple
occasions, where his tone tended to convey his outrage at what he
viewed as the Court overstepping its role. This outrage tended to be
expressed by means of memorable phrases or metaphors which
strongly denoted Justice Scalia's contempt for the majority's opinion.
His phraseology suggests that the dissents were intended for the legal
academy and posterity. Justice Scalia generally spent about ten

88. Complexity was calculated using the F1esch Kincaid reading ease scale
which measures the average number of words used per sentence. Then the
average number of syllables per word are factored in. The average number of
words is then multiplied by 0.39 and added to the average number of syllables
per word, multiplied by 11.8. 15.59 is then subtracted from the result. See The
Flesch Grade Level Readability Formula, READABILITY FORMULAS,
https://readabilityformulas.com/flesch-grade-level-readability-formula. php (last
accessed Apr. 25, 2020). Both Justices' dissents were evaluated as around 40
which would make them difficult to read according to the Flesch Reading Ease
scale.
89. This is according to Owens and Wedeking, who rank Justice Scalia's
opinions and dissents as among the clearest of the Justices in their study. Ryan
J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the
Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 L. & Soc'y REV. 1027, 1043
(2011). Scalia's cognitive clarity in part derived from his originalist approach
which adjudicated issues as constitutional based on whether the Founders would
have viewed them as constitutional. See infra Part V. According to my results
Justice Scalia's dissents require a full grade higher reading level than Justice
Ginsburg's.
90. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS xxvii-xxix (2012).
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minutes reading his dissents aloud. 91 If one examines the types of
cases in which Scalia dissented, they seem to constitute what could
be construed as an anti-canon. Jamal Greene describes the anticanon as being decided by "the attitude the constitutional interpretive
community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision
has come to represent, and the susceptibility of the decision to use as
an antiprecedent." 92 Specifically, Justice Scalia took a particularly
hostile view towards the majority's opinions in respect of the
expansion of gay rights and limitations on the death penalty. If it
was Scalia's intention in writing these dissents that his decisions
would someday be seen as visionary and adopted by the majority, he
appears doomed to be disappointed as gay rights now seem firmly
entrenched in the law, as do the ethical considerations that the death
penalty should not be imposed on minors or people with intellectual
disabilities.
Justice Ginsburg's oral dissents, in contrast, tended to be issued
in cases involving any form of discrimination, whether employment
discrimination or in respect of access to reproductive rights. Her oral
dissents are slightly more accessible to a broader audience than
Justice Scalia's, in that the reading level required to comprehend
them is lower than the level required by Justice Scalia's dissents.93
However, they are cognitively more complex because they take
disparate views into consideration and tend not to see the issue in
shades of black and white. 94 Justice Ginsburg relied on a more
diverse range of sources including sociological sources, factual
evidence, testimony before Congress, and transcripts from the trial
court record. She was also slightly more inclined to assert her own
personal experience into the dissents and was more keenly attuned to
the facts of the cases in which she dissented, as well as the impact
that the decision would have on the litigants. Ginsburg also resorted
to rhetorical techniques often associated with feminist jurisprudence
to convey her points. This suggests that her audience was not
necessarily the legal academy but may have included the majority,
the press, the public, and the litigants themselves. She also often
91. See e.g., Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 14:29-24:10, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05184.
92. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011)
(emphasis omitted); see also Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided''.·
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681-82 (2005); J.M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
963, 1018-19 (1998); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative
Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009).
93. On average Justice Ginsburg's dissents required a thirteenth grade level
to understand, while Justice Scalia's require a fourteenth grade level. See infra
Appendices A and B.
94. At least according to Owens and Wedeking's definition of cognitive
complexity. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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exhorted Congress to act or the Court to change its mind. Her tone
was notably less acerbic than Scalia's when she read her dissents, as
if she was still attempting to persuade the Court or Congress. The
Justice spent an average of about six minutes reading a summary of
her dissents aloud. 95 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,96
however, her oral dissent took approximately fifteen minutes. 97
The data in the attached table in Appendix A illustrate that three
of Scalia's fourteen oral dissents came in Eighth Amendment cases,98
three came in respect to Fourteenth Amendment cases, 99 two in
respect to habeas corpus, and one each in respect to the First, Fourth,
and Sixth Amendments; 10o the rest pertained to Congress's taxing
authority, federalism issues, administrative law, and statutory
interpretation.101
In respect to Justice Ginsburg, the data attached in Appendix B
shows that she orally dissented in nineteen cases during the period of
2000 to 2019. Not surprisingly, four of her dissents came in Title VII

95. See infra Appendix B.
96. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
97. See Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:01-14:26, Part Two, Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-354.
98. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 550-51 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 713 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(addressing the Fourth Amendment); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 151-53
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing the Sixth Amendment); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826---27 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing habeas
corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 655-56 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(same); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (addressing the First Amendment).
101. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 67 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (addressing statutory interpretation and federalism issues); King
v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 4 73, 498 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing
Congress's taxing authority, administrative law, and statutory interpretation);
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 525 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (addressing administrative law and statutory interpretation);
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416---17 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(addressing federalism issues).
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cases, 102 two came in equal protection cases, 103 one in respect to the
right to abortion, 104 and one in respect to access to contraception,105
The rest were a range of presidential powers, sovereign immunity,
class action certification, injunction standards, and a Section 1983
claim. 106
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S AUTONOMOUS VIEW OF LAW: RULE -BASED
DISSENTS AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY As AUDIENCE

In their study of the complexity of Supreme Court opinions,
Owens and Wedeking have found that Justice Scalia's opinions are
the clearest out of those of a cohort of seventeen Supreme Court
Justices. 107 Using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count ("LIWC")
system of assessment, which focuses on cognitive clarity, (i.e., the
clarity of the ideas discussed), Wedeking and Owens have found that
Scalia consistently authors the clearest opinions, no matter what area
of law is before the Court.1° 8 They further note that dissents tend to
be written even more clearly than majority opinions, and once again,
Scalia's dissents are the clearest among the Justices. 109 It should be
noted that Owens and Wedeking based their assessment solely on
cognitive clarity as opposed to doctrinal or rhetorical clarity. 110

102. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 451 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 363 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,608 (2009) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S 618, 643--44
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
103. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 334 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 620 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 739 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
106. See Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 45--46 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 79 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing a Section 1983 claim); Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S 367, 395-96 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing
presidential powers and injunction standards).
107. The Justices include Alito, Black, Blackmun, Brennan, Breyer, Burger,
Douglas, Ginsburg, Harlan, Kennedy, Marshall, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist,
Roberts, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Stewart, Thomas, and White.
108. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1038---39, 1043.
109. Id. at 1033. The authors note, "every justice in our sample authors
clearer dissents than majority opinions. All justices in recent history present
their opinions differently when in dissent-and the difference is large for many
justices. Look first at Justice Scalia . . . . When he authors a majority opinion,
Scalia's complexity score is -0.099 [-0.464, 0.267]. When he authors a dissent,
however, his complexity score drops to -2. 788 [-3.246, -2.33]." Id. at 1046.
110. Rhetorical clarity is usually measured by the Flesch Kincaid and other
scales, while doctrinal clarity would be assessed by analyzing the Court's
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Justice Scalia: Cognitive Clarity, Textualism, and Originalism
"The Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but
dead, or, as I prefer to call it, enduring. ... It means today not
what current society, much less the Court, thinks it ought to
mean but what it meant when it was adopted." 111

Wedeking and Owens define cognitive complexity as comprising
differentiation and integration. They assert that:
Differentiation represents the degree to which an individual
acknowledges multiple perspectives or dimensions associated
with an issue. In other words, ... whether an individual
perceives and explains events in black and white or sees the
world in shades of gray. Integration, on the other hand,
represents the degree to which a person recognizes
relationships and connections among these perspectives or
dimensions. It represents how an individual structures his or
her thoughts and organizes decision-relevant information. 112
Thus, judges who tend to disregard multiple perspectives and
view things in more absolute terms tend to write clearer opinions.
This may largely explain why Justice Scalia's opinions were
determined to be the clearest. Scalia appears to have subscribed to
the autopoietic or autonomous approach to law. 113 As previously
referenced, the autonomous view of the law asserts that ''law's
intellectual and systemic development proceeds according to a logic,
procedure, and rationale of its own." 114 In other words, law operates
autonomously and without regard for social conditions and changed
circumstances.1 15 Adopting an autopoietic view of the law means that

decisions in the same area of law to determine if the Court has used and applied
terms and concepts consistently. See id. at 1038.
111. Jeffrey Toobin, The Trump Impeachment Hearings and Justice Antonin
Scalia, NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycommen tithe-trump-impeachment-hearings-and-justice-antonin-scalia (quoting
Antonin Scalia).
112. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1038----39.
113. Several authors have described the autonomous view oflaw as being an
example of an "autopoietic system," that is, a system that is closed and reproduces
itself by essentially only relying on its own constructs to validate itself. See, e.g.,
Dimitris Michailakis, Law as an Autopoietic System, 38 ACTA SOCIOL0GICA 323,
329 (1995). See also Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous is Law?, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & Soc. SCI. 45, 46 (2007) (contrasting the autonomous view of the law to other
socio-legal studies).
114. Tomlins, supra note 113, at 46.
115. See id. at 4~7 (defining the meaning oflaw as a closed system); see also
Gunther Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg,
18 L. & Soc'y REV. 291, 292 (1984) (quoting Humberto Maturana who describes
such a system as one that "produces and reproduces its own elements by the
interaction of its elements").

344

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

one ignores virtually any contextual, social, or political factors in
determining the outcome of a case. Decisions made in the autopoietic
process derive their validity from normative rules such as the texts of
the Constitution, statutes, or existing precedent; 116 the judges
making those decisions do not generally have recourse to nonlegal
texts, facts, policy, or other extraneous considerations. There is a
circularity and a certain self-referential structure to that process. As
Michailakis has reiterated, "[t]his basal circularity of the law is the
foundation for legal autonomy. One cannot speak of legal autonomy
if conflicts are decided in the general context of political and social
processes." 117 Whether one approves of this approach, it generally
makes the outcome of a case clear because it is reached by applying
fixed rules. Since this was Scalia's methodology, it is not surprising
that his opinions rank as the clearest and easiest to read by Owens
and Wedeking.
Scalia's deep commitment to originalism, formalism, and
textualism prompted him to write opinions or dissents as if there
could only be one correct outcome. That outcome was unfailingly
dependent on the text or previously established authority, regardless
of changed social circumstances or the facts of a particular case.1 18
Alongside his reliance on originalism in interpreting the Constitution
as the Framers understood it, Scalia saw his role generally as stating
and implementing the law as it was written. 119 The "text is the law,"
he once wrote, and he endeavored to faithfully maintain that position
despite compelling facts or legislative history. 120 "Of all the criticisms
leveled against textualism," he once wrote, "the most mindless is that
it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is, of course it's formalistic! The

116. Michailakis, supra note 113, at 327 (explaining that the ''legal system
determines what is in accordance with law and what is not").
117. Id. at 330 (quoting Teubner, supra note 115, at 295).
118. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179-80 (1989).
119. Mark Sherman, In Victory or Dissent, Scalia was a Man of Strong
Opinions, CHI. TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2016, 5:43 PM), https://www.chicago
tribune.corn/politics/ct-scalia-strong-opinions-20160213-story.html.
120. Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV.
783, 788 (2017). Berman writes: "In a coauthored book published fifteen years
after A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia asserts that 'we are governed not by
unexpressed or inadequately expressed ''legislative goals" but by the law'; that
'the true law is' what an enacted text 'state[s]'; and that 'it is the text's
meaning ... that binds us as law."' Id. at 791 n.25. Berman asserts, "Statements
such as these all indicate a constitutive claim. Other passages in the same book,
however, strongly indicate that Scalia continues to understand his project in
prescriptive terms, as when he and Garner insist that the textual-originalist
approach they advocate is 'unapologetically normative, prescribing
what ... courts ought to do with operative language."' Id.
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rule of law is about form ... Long live formalism. It is what makes a
government a government of laws and not of men." 121
Scalia also urged the use of canons of interpretation, rather than
legislative history, to interpret texts where the plain meaning was not
obvious, insisting that if "judges followed these 'valid canons' they
would be more constrained and law would be more predictable." 122 He
also tended not to be moved by the facts of a particular case before the
Court. He once chided that "[r]eporters cared too much whether the
'little old lady won or lost' before the Supreme Court." 123 "I couldn't
care less," he noted, "as long as we get the law right." 124 This
approach whereby law becomes essentially self-referential is, as
Michailakis has noted, the medium by which the law itself reproduces
its normative elements.12s
Scalia urged a rigorously applied, rule-based philosophy,
asserting:
When one is dealing, as my Court often is, with issues so
heartfelt that they are believed by one side or the other to be
resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not greatly appeal to
one's sense of justice to say: "[w]ell, that earlier case had nine
factors, this one has nine plus one." Much better, even at the
expense of the mild substantive distortion that any
generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously
enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the
decision. 126
Scalia seemed comfortable with the effect of these "mild
substantive distortions" on the litigants. He even went so far as to
suggest that the outcome of any one particular case might be
irrelevant. 127 He decried "the attitude of the common-law judge-the

121. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 25 (1997).
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons,
113 CouJM. L. REV. 531, 534 (2013) (book review). Eskridge asserts that Scalia
and Garner's "exegesis of dozens of canons actually undermines the conceptual
theses of the book and of Scalia's legisprudence" in part because they cherry-pick
their canons, as well as the fact that the canons themselves demand normative
analysis. Id. at 535-37.
123. Sherman, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. Michailakis, supra note 113, at 327; see also Teubner, supra note 115, at
295.
126. Scalia, supra note 118, at 11 78.
127. As he told Harvard students with respect to one particular case, "if you
think it is terribly important that the case came out wrong, you are not yet
thinking like a lawyer-or at least not like a common lawyer. That is really
secondary. Famous old cases are famous, you see, not because they came out
right, but because the rule of law they announced was the intelligent one."
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mindset that asks, 'What is the most desirable resolution of this case,
and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result be
evaded?"' 12 8 The Justice even once poked fun at this formulaic
methodology of interpreting laws according to whether they would
have been constitutional at the time of the Framers. In an interview
with New York Magazine, Scalia noted:
[I]f a state enacted a law permitting flogging, it is immensely
stupid, but it is not unconstitutional. A lot of stuff that's stupid
is not unconstitutional. I gave a talk once where I said they
ought to pass out to all federal judges a stamp, and the stamp
says ... STUPID BUT CONSTITUTIONAL. 12 9
This rule-based philosophy does generally have the effect of
rendering opinions, whether majority or dissenting, clear. Although
in their study Owens and Wedeking did not analyze the Justices'
opinions and dissents according to doctrinal clarity, Scalia's opinions
would presumably have ranked highly in clarity on that scale too,
since his philosophy as an "honest originalist" was relatively
consistent.1 30 However, when analyzing Justice Scalia's oral dissents
in respect to rhetorical clarity, because of their erudite references,
they require a more educated listener or reader. Hence an analysis
based on rhetorical clarity provides additional insights about the
audience and purpose for his dissents.

B. Rhetorical Clarity and Justice Scalia's Dissenting Anti-Canon:
Audience, Language, Tone, and Impact
"The language of the law, along with other discourses of the
powerful, lays down the very terms within which subordinate
groups are able to experience the world and articulate their
aspirations. ''13 1
Rhetorical clarity is often assessed in terms of how accessible the
text is to the reader. 132 Among the most common assessment tools for

Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United

States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Lecture at
Princeton University (Mar. 8-9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES, at 79, 82 (1978).
128. Id. at 88.
129. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4,
2013), https://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
130. See id. Scalia referred to himself as an honest originalist in a
conversation with New York Magazine, noting ''I try to be an honest
originalist!" Id.
131. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 170 (1991).
132. Scott Consigny, Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle's Concept of
Rhetorical Clarity, 17 RHETORIC Soc'Y Q. 413, 414 (1987) (''If the proper function
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determining clarity, often used interchangeably with readability or
accessibility, are the Flesch Kincaid Reading scale and other similar
tools.1 33 These tools focus on sentence length, the complexity of the
vocabulary used, and the clarity of the ideas expressed. 13 4
Accessibility is often recorded as a grade reading level. 13 5 The idea
that legal opinions should be rhetorically clear is not new. Judge
Posner, for example, argued that judicial opinions should be readable
by lay persons. 136 Assessing Justice Scalia's oral dissents using a
combination of reading scales shows that his dissents rated slightly
more complex than Justice Ginsburg's. They required a fourteenth
grade reading level to comprehend them, while Justice Ginsburg's
required a thirteenth grade level. This distinction held true for other
scales like Coleman Liau, the SMOG Index, and the FOG scale, which
also all measure similar factors. The reading ease level of Scalia's
dissents was also slightly, but not significantly, higher than
Ginsburg's. 13 7

of rhetorical speech is to transparently transmit the rhetor's meaning-namely,
his reasoned interpretation of a given situation-without undue distortion or
interference, then presumably Aristotle's rhetor should eschew deceptive verbal
ornamentation.").
133. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, READABILITY FORMULAS,
https://readabilityformulas.com/flesch-reading-ease-readability-formula.php
(last visited Apr. 25, 2021). See also The Coleman-Liau Readability Formula
(also known as The Coleman-Liau Index), READABILITY FORMULAS,
https://readabilityformulas.com/coleman-liau-readability-formula.php
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2021); The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula,
READABILITY FORMULAS, https://readabilityformulas.com/gunning-fog-readability
-formula.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2021); How to Use the SMOG Readability
Formula
on
Health
Literacy
Materials,
READABILITY
FORMULAS,
https ://readabilityformulas.com/articles/how-to-use-smog-readability-formulason-health-literacy-materials. php (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
134. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note 133; The
Coleman-Liau Readability Formula (also known as The Coleman-Liau Index),
supra note 133; The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula, supra
note 133; How to Use the SMOG Readability Formula on Health Literacy
Materials, supra note 133.
135. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note 133; The
Coleman-Liau Readability Formula (also known as The Coleman-Liau Index),
supra note 133; The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula, supra
note 133; How to Use the SMOG Readability Formula on Health Literacy
Materials, supra note 133.
136. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal
Courts - One Judge's Views, 51 DuQ. L. REV. 3, 9 (2013) (arguing that a judicial
realist appellate judge, among other factors "wants judicial decisions to 'make
sense' in a way that could be explained to, and persuade, a lay person ... [and]
has a distaste for legal jargon and wants judicial opinions, so far as possible, to
be readable by non-lawyers ....").
137. Scalia's reading ease number was 14.05 grade level required, while
Ginsburg's was 13.3. This means Scalia's dissents were slightly more challenging
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However, in assessing the rhetorical clarity of oral dissents, to
focus only on readability indices ignores other important rhetorical
components like the kinds of cases in which Justice Scalia dissented
and what he actually said in dissent, along with his voice and tone.
Moreover, just because his dissents were relatively accessible does not
mean that his audience was the public. Although his oral dissents
were reported in the press, the audience he was apparently targeting
was more specific than the general public.

1.

The Anti-Canon-Why Justice Scalia Tended to Dissent

One of the hypotheses of this study was that because of Scalia's
commitment to originalism and textualism, he would reserve his most
scathing dissents for cases where the majority focused on the
particular circumstances of a case or achieving a particular outcome
rather than the "text" or "rules" themselves. That hypothesis proved
to be generally true. However, there was also an ideological pattern
to Scalia's dissents which suggested that ideology played an outsized
role-almost as if Scalia were trying to fashion a conservative anticanon. If one looks at the pattern of his dissents, two were in death
penalty cases: one involving a man with an intellectual disability, and
one involving a defendant who had committed crimes while a
minor. 138 In those cases, as discussed more fully below, Scalia
disregarded factual evidence regarding the petitioners' mental
disability and immature cognitive abilities, respectively, in favor of
his assertion that defendants like them should nevertheless be
executed. He was also outraged at the thought of providing habeas
rights and due process for Guantanamo detainees 139 or upholding the
ACA. 14 Finally, he was steadfast in his outspoken rejection of rights

°

than Ginsburg's. See The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note
133 (The specific mathematical formula is:
FKRA = (0.39 x ASL)+ (11.8 x ASW) - 15.59
FKRA = Flesch-Kincaid Reading Age
ASL= Average Sentence Length (i.e., the number of words divided by the number
of sentences
ASW = Average number of Syllable per Word (i.e., the number of syllables divided
by the number of words)).
138. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555--56 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
139. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 655 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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being accorded the LGBTQ community, as evidenced by his dissents
in Lawrence, 141 Windsor, 142 and Obergefell. 143
Based on the fact that he tended to dissent on ideological
grounds, one might assume that Scalia aspired to write so-called
canonical dissents--dissents that are later redeemed for their
holdings by future courts, or serve as warnings for the future, and
thus shape constitutional development.1 44 Primus has suggested that
dissents may become canonical because "of the identity of their
authors, the number of Justices who joined them, their literary
merits, the general philosophy they espouse, or the issues upon which
they were written." 14 5 The major canonical dissents that are widely
accepted are Plessy, 146 Lochner, 147 Olmsted, 148 Korematsu, 149 and the
free speech dissents by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 150 Scalia
certainly generated the larger-than-life persona required of a
canonical author, wrote eloquently and entertainingly, and made it
clear that, at least on occasion, he was writing for the wisdom of a

141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 798 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
143. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 713 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. Primus, supra note 41, at 243, 245 ("Constitutional law ... has not only
a canon composed of the most revered constitutional texts but also an anti-canon
composed of the most reviled ones. Lochner and Plessy are anti-canonical cases.").
145. Id. at 250. See also Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the
Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784 n.11 (2000) ("It follows that, in
order for a dissent to be canonized, it must both be famous and be the subject of
frequent reference within the legal community. As fame is a difficult quality to
measure, this Article gauges the status of individual dissents by the number of
favorable references they have garnered in subsequent Supreme Court
opinions-with ten references as a baseline for canonical status.").
146. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552---64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
148. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
149. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dis sen ting).
150. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also Krishnakumar, supra note 145, at 795 n. 73 ("[Brandeis's
concurrence in Whitney] is often considered a dissent because Holmes and
Brandeis disagreed with the majority on substantive grounds, concurring in their
judgment only because of a procedural issue (e.g., the defendant had failed to
raise the clear-and-present danger defense, on which Holmes and Brandeis based
their finding that his actions were lawful, at the trial level). The Whitney
concurrence has been cited 51 times .... The dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), has been cited 26 times.")
(citations omitted).
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future day.15 1 Primus suggests that judges who ascribe to the
autonomous view of law tend to see their audiences as the legal
academy because of their intellectual contributions to the law. 152
Consistent with this, Scalia himself acknowledged that his
audience was primarily the legal elite and that the function of dissent
is to put "the Court in the forefront of the intellectual development of
the law." 153 Ferguson has noted that often "judges associate their own
views with a correct course in history" 154 which Scalia seems to have
done, as he used phrases like "[t]he Nation will live to regret what the
court has done today," 155 and this ruling "will almost certainly cause
more Americans to be killed." 156 Ferguson asserts that:
Even more than historians, they Liudges] need to find
themselves on the victorious side in a continuum of past,
present, and future, and their natural recourse is the telling
example, which brings history to bear in manageable doses.
Judgment, after all, is not a record of the past; it uses the past
selectively in an assessment of normality or, more rarely, in a
prescription for a possible normalization. 157
One may intuit Scalia's desire to normalize his own moral
approach, and at the same time write canonical dissents, when
examining some of the prophetic and sweeping phrases that he used.
He opened his dissent in Windsor with the words, "[t]his case is about
power in several respects. It is about the power of our people to
govern themselves, and the power of this Court to pronounce the law.
Today's opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable
consequence of diminishing the former." 158 In the same case, he
closed his dissent, "[b]ut the Court has cheated both sides, robbing
the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that
comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better." 159 In
Lawrence, he accused the Court of having signed on to the
''homosexual agenda," claiming that:
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
151. Primus, supra note 41, at 278-79.
152. Id. at 251.
153. David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On
Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL .APPROACHES 112 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999).
154. Ferguson, supra note 63, at 214.
155. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 850 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 828.
157. Ferguson, supra note 63, at 214.
158. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id. at 802 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as
protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that
they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it
as "discrimination" which it is the function of our judgments to
deter. So imbued is the Court with the law profession's antianti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream ...."160

In King v. Burwell, 161 he referred back to National Federation, 16 2
a case in which Justice Kennedy read their joint dissent from the
bench, noting that "the cases will publish forever the discouraging
truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws
over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and
assist its favorites." 163 However in many of Scalia's dissents, he
appears to be on the wrong side of history in that his dissents seek to
deny rights to people like the LGBTQ community, criminal
defendants who are mentally disabled or emotionally and cognitively
immature, noncitizens seeking habeas and due process rights, or
people who lack health care. The approach taken by Scalia in all of
those respects does not bend towards justice. His dissents on those
cases might then be considered part of a dissenting anti-canon, rather
than the canon.
2.

The Rhetoric of Rules-A Disregard for Facts

Justice Scalia demonstrated his stated philosophical approach
about viewing law as a set of rules without regard to the parties before
the Court in multiple oral dissents and, in so doing, dispelled any
doubt that his audience was not the litigants. One of the most
compelling examples of this was his dissent in the death penalty case
of Roper v. Simmons. 164 Three years earlier in Atkins, 165 a death
penalty challenge involving a mentally disabled defendant convicted
of murder, Scalia orally dissented from the majority opinion which
found the death penalty unconstitutional for individuals with mental
disabilities. 166 In his oral dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia spoke (and
later wrote) dismissively about the trend among states of enacting
statutes prohibiting the execution of defendants with mental
disabilities, noting "the oldest of the statutes is 14 years old, five were

160.
161.
162.
163.
lndep.
164.
165.
166.
(2002)

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
576 U.S. 473 (2015).
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
576 U.S. 473, 518 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Nat'l Fed'n of
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 6:55, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(No. 00-8452), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-8452.
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enacted last year, over half were enacted in the past eight years." 16 7
Scalia showed little to no concern for the fate of the Petitioner himself
and even questioned the level of his mental disability, referring to
him as "mildly mental[ly] retarded." 168 Similarly in Roper, he wrote
scathingly of "the evolving standards of decency of our national
society," 169 which the majority had found militated against the death
penalty being imposed on defendants who had committed crimes
while minors. Scalia derided the notion that a "national consensus"
against executing minors could have developed over a period of a mere
fifteen years and criticized the Court for taking into account the fact
that most other countries have banned the execution of minors. 170 He
also critiqued studies that suggested that the moral decision-making
abilities of minors was not fully developed. 171 He seemed to be
unconcerned that, if his approach were to be adopted, the executions
of minors would continue (at least in some states) until a more evident
consensus had emerged in society. To ignore the particular defendant
before the Court and others similarly situated is to ignore the fact
that the law is concerned with people.
James Boyd White urges young lawyers to consider the
"humanity and inhumanity in speech, particularly in professional
speech." 172 Scalia might have been advised to take that adage into
account in respect to Simmons and others like him. Boyd White also
poses the question, "[w]hat does the writer choose to say about
himself and his subject in the way he chooses to write?" 173 When one
reads Roper or Lawrence through the lens of that question, one is
struck by Scalia's callous disregard of many of the individuals whose
cases came before him, as he privileged the status quo and pure legal
analysis over what Boyd White terms "the raw material of life." 17 4
Scalia's rhetoric in these cases embodies the kind of tough
mindedness that Wetlaufer has described in other contexts as a
commitment to "orderliness in discourse, to objectivity, to clarity and
logic, to binary judgment, and the closure of controversies." 17 5 This
kind of impersonal voice and autopoietic approach, while it may be
clear, ignores the lives and experiences of the litigants before the
Court while purporting to neutrally dispense justice. Yet in so doing,
it
also
ignores
the
fact
that
these
"rhetorical
commitments ... disempower the already powerless ... [and]

167. Id. at 12:00-12:12.
168. Id. at 8:44---8:51.
169. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 10:00-10:10, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-633.
170. Id. at 10:11-10:19.
171. Id. at 12:50.
172. WHITE, supra note 1, at 109.
173. Id. at 110.
174. Id. at 243.
175. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1552.
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reinforce the existing distribution of power and wealth." 176 Moreover,
although Scalia asserted that his dissent was motivated by the
conviction that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that
of legislatures, 177 he seemed willing to substitute his own judgment
for the facts in some cases. In Roper, he noted in respect to studies
submitted by the American Psychological Association to the effect
that minors did not have the same moral capacity to reason as adults,
"[a]t most, these studies conclude that, on average, or in most cases,
persons under 18 are unable to take moral responsibility for their
actions. Not one of the cited studies opines that all individuals under
18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes." 178 Given that
psychologists had testified that Christopher Simmons was "very
immature," "very impulsive," and "very susceptible to being
manipulated or influenced," 179 it seems extremely unlikely that
Simmons fell into the category of minors who could fully appreciate
the nature and consequences of his crimes. Moreover, as Justice
Kennedy pointed out in the majority opinion, "[t]he experts testified
about Simmons' background including a difficult home environment
and dramatic changes in behavior, accompanied by poor school
performance in adolescence. Simmons was absent from home for long
periods, spending time using alcohol and drugs with other teenagers
or young adults."1so
Scalia's focus on the "rule" as opposed to sociological evidence or
the facts was also evident during other oral dissents. In King u.
Burwell, 18 1 he demonstrated his commitment to his vision of legal
legitimacy-textualism-urging in his dissent that "[t]he plain,
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred
to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of
a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful
intellect would discover." 182 Despite the finding of the majority in
upholding the ACA as a constitutional exercise of Congress's taxing
power, Scalia reiterated his "plain meaning'' approach in interpreting
the statute, when he posited "[u]nder all the usual rules of
interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case." 183 He
went on to note sarcastically "[b]ut normal rules of interpretation

176. Id. at 1596.
177. Scalia questioned in Roper, "By what conceivable warrant can nine
lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?" Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1 79. Id. at 559.
180. Id.
181. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
182. Id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.,
267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925)).
183. Id.
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seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court:
The Affordable Care Act must be saved." 184
Contrast that approach with Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for
the majority, which he began by noting the history and purpose
behind the enactment of the ACA. "The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ... grew out of a long history of failed health
insurance reform." 185 Roberts went on to point out that the "Act seeks
to make insurance more affordable by giving ... tax credits to
individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400
percent of the federal poverty line." 186
In finding the ACA
constitutional, he conceded that "[i]t is true that we generally try to
avoid interpreting a statute in a way that makes some language
superfluous. But we have said that is not an absolute rule, and it does
not seem particularly helpful in interpreting this statute." 187 The
dichotomy between Scalia's and Roberts's approaches epitomizes the
purely analytical versus the narrative approach, as Boyd White would
put it, 1ss or the textual rule-based approach contrasted with one that
took the sociological implications and legislative intent of the ACA
into account. Roberts endorsed this approach when he asserted a
"fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the
legislative plan. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve
health insurance markets not to destroy them." 189
Scalia's preference for textual legal legitimacy and his disdain for
the majority's reliance on sociological legitimacy was also manifested
in Obergefell v. Hodges, an opinion in which he strongly dissented but
did not read from the bench; Chief Justice Roberts read his own
relatively lengthy dissent from the bench instead.1 90 In response to
the majority's finding that denying the benefits of marriage to same
sex couples constituted a denial of equal protection and due process
because it denied those couples dignity and the full protection of the
law, Scalia noted dismissively, "[t]he world does not expect logic and
precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them
in the law. The stuff contained in today's opinion has to diminish this
Court's reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis." 191 His

184. Id.
185. Id. at 4 79 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 482.
187. Oral Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts at 7:11-7:27, Part 1, King v.
Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14-114), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14114.
188. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 243, 245.
189. Oral Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts at 10:43-10:53, Part 1, King v.
Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14-114), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14114.
190. Oral Dissent of Chief Justice Roberts, Part Two, Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556.
191. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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disdain for relying on changed circumstances as a justification for the
majority ruling also was strongly evident in Lawrence v. Texas and
United States v. Windsor. In Lawrence, he posited that the majority's
holding usurped the function of the legislature: "One of the benefits
of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the
courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their
logical conclusion." 192 He stated further, "[i]t is clear from this that
the Court has taken sides in the culture war and in particular, in that
battle of the culture war that concerns whether there should be any
moral opprobrium attached to homosexual conduct." 193 He then
chided the Court for being "so imbued ... with the law profession's
anti-anti-homosexual culture that it is seemingly unaware that the
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that in most
States what the Court calls discrimination against those who engage
in homosexual acts is perfectly legal." 194 In Windsor, he rejected the
notion that laws "favoring man-woman marriage no more demeans
and humiliates other sexual relationships than favoring our
constitution demeans and humiliates the governmental systems of
other countries." 195 Thus, in both cases he rejected the sociological
evidence cited by the majority that showed that laws denying equal
protection to LGBTQ groups impacted their dignity in ways that the
Court should take into account.1 96 In Windsor, he registered his
outrage when he decried the majority for essentially rendering
anyone opposed to the traditional definition of marriage as "an enemy
of human decency."197

192. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 14:23-14:35, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102. He stated,
"[s]ocial perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time and every
group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is
best, that homosexuals have achieved some success in that enterprise is attested
to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining states that criminalized
consensual homosexual acts, but persuading ones fellow citizens is one thing, and
imposing ones views in absence of democratic majority will is something else."
Id. at 13:01-13:35.
193. Id. at 11:02-11:16.
194. Id. at 11:56---12:18.
195. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 5:22-5:35, Part Two, United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12307.
196. In Windsor, he averred, "[t]he majority is sure ... [the DOMA's] purpose
is to disparage, injure, degrade, demean and humiliate our fellow human beings,
our fellow citizens who are homosexual." Id. at 8:04--8:16. See also supra text
accompanying notes 192-93 (describing Scalia's view that such discrimination is
"perfectly legal" in "most states" and his displeasure with what he termed as the
Court's involvement in a "culture war").
197. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 800 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In both versions of the dissents he also used the Latin phrase "hostis
humani generis." Id. at 798.
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However, while he presented himself as a strict textualist, Scalia
did not always consistently follow that approach. While Scalia had
criticized the majority's approach in King, 198 as being one that
essentially focused on the desired result and worked to interpret the
law to achieve that result, he was not as contemptuous of that type of
approach when it came to Brown v. Plata. 199 In that case, the
majority upheld an injunction that resulted in the release of forty-six
thousand convicted criminals from California's overcrowded
prisons. 20° The Court held that the release was mandated because of
system wide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental
health care that ... subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in
California to 'substantial risk of serious harm' and cause the
delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. 201
Scalia viewed the case as one "whose proper outcome is so clearly
indicated by tradition and common sense, that its decision ought to
shape the law, rather than vice versa." 202 Although he had been
critical of the Court's approach to reading the statute in King, he
expressed surprise that the Court in Brown had declined to ''bend
every effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous
result." 203
Scalia also went on to express his unhappiness with the district
court's fact finding in respect to the impact that the release of
prisoners would have on the safety and welfare of the California
public.204 The district court relied on expert testimony to conclude
that "shortening the length of stay through earned credits would give
inmates incentives to participate in programming designed to lower
recidivism," 205 and that "slowing the flow of technical parole violators
to prison, thereby substantially reducing the churning of parolees,
would by itself improve both the prison and parole systems, and
public safety." 206 Scalia disputed the possibility that the court had
been persuaded by the expert testimony, asserting without any
apparent basis that, "the idea that the three District Judges in this
case relied solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses
is fanciful. Of course they were relying largely on their own beliefs

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
563 U.S. 493 (2011).
Id. at 501---02.
Id. at 505 n.3; see also id. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 556---57.
Id. at 556.
Id.
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about penology and recidivism." 207 Scalia penned this despite the fact
that even he himself acknowledged that "the District Court devoted
nearly 10 days of trial and 70 pages of its opinion to this issue."2os
Additionally, Scalia's emphasis on textualism and originalism
obfuscates the fact that this approach serves to protect the status quo,
which is not necessarily neutral, often favors the already privileged,
and may well serve to entrench the patriarchy. Katharine Bartlett
has argued that a feminist approach to law requires ''looking beneath
the surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules and the
assumptions underlying them and insisting upon applications ofrules
that do not perpetuate women's subordination." 209 This approach is
similar to that advocated for by critical race theorists or critical legal
studies advocates, although their analysis of the law's potential
discriminatory impact obviously extends beyond women. Critical
race or legal theorists have exposed how law "can be substantively
unfair or tilted toward the interests of the powerful"210 and thus
undermine or negate the interests of the least powerful, including
people of color, the LGBTQ community, women, and the poor and
disenfranchised. In emphasizing the Constitution as its Framers
originally intended it, Scalia overlooked the impact of that approach
on these groups.
It should also be noted that Scalia reserved some of his most
outraged dissents for cases which contravened his jurisprudential
philosophy-specifically instances where he asserted that the Court
was fashioning the law to attain a particular end and, in doing so, had
imposed the minority rule of an elite set of judges on the country. 211
Scalia urged that it was the reasoning of an opinion that commended
it to its audience, noting that "an opinion that gets the reasons wrong
gets everything wrong."2 12 This is not to suggest that Scalia took
dissenting lightly. He recognized the potential serious consequences
207. Id. at 557.
208. Id.
209. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
843 (1990).
210. Jack M. Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN
AMERICAN LAW 64, 67 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009).
211. An example of this would be King v. Burwell where Scalia maintained
that the Court was engaging in a convoluted interpretation of the Affordable Care
Act and in so doing twisting the language of the statute to achieve the desired
end. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 509 (2015) (''The Court has not come
close to presenting the compelling contextual case necessary to justify departing
from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the law. Quite the contrary, context
only underscores the outlandishness of the Court's interpretation. Reading the
Act as a whole, leaves no doubt about the matter: 'Exchange established by the
State' means what it looks like it means.").
212. Antonin Scalia, The Nineteenth Annual Lecture: The Dissenting Opinion,
Address given to the Supreme Court Historical Society as the Society's Annual
Lecture (June 13, 199), in J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33 (Dec. 1994).
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of a dissent on the institution of the Court, noting that "[t]he foremost
and undeniable external consequence of a separate dissenting or
concurring opm1on is to destroy the appearance of unity and
solidarity."213

3.
The Court and the Separation of Powers
Another consistent theme that emerges in several of Justice
Scalia's oral dissents is that the Court is an elitist institution
imposing its undemocratic will on the people and, in doing so,
usurping the role of the legislature. Scalia seems to have believed
that the federal government was impinging on the power of the
states. 214 In distancing himself vociferously from the majority in
those types of cases, Scalia metaphorically opened up a large
conversational space into which he invited conservative legal
academia, future readers, and the public. In some cases, Scalia's tone
is outraged, but in others, he affects a disinterested tone as if he does
not have a stake in the outcome of the cases. In EPA v. EME
Homer, 215 for example, a case involving whether the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") could impose regulations to protect
"downwind" states from the pollution of their "upwind" neighbors, he
maintained that "these are not cases of earth shaking importance." 216
This pronouncement is similar to his affected disinterest in Lawrence
v. Texas, wherein he asserted that despite his opposition to the Court
finding Texas's law against sodomy unconstitutional, "[l]et me be
clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group
promoting their agenda through normal democratic means." 217
Scalia's word choice perhaps betrayed him as the idea that there is a
''homosexual agenda" tends to be a claim advanced by the religious
right.
Moreover, while Scalia's insistence on deference to legislatures
sounds like a neutral resolution of these cases in accordance with
Article I of the Constitution, it ignores the facts that one, it is
exceedingly difficult to get a constitutional amendment passed; and

213. Id. at 35.
214. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), wherein he wrote
"[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program ....
[S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty." Id. Printz involved the constitutionality of
background checks under the Brady Act. Id. Much of Justice Scalia's majority
opinion was devoted to a discussion of the Federalist Papers.
215. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014).
216. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 00:10---0:13, Part Two, EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P.,
572 U.S. 489 (2014) (No. 12-1182),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1182.
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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two, our federal or even state legislatures are hardly truly
representative bodies. 218 Scalia himself pointed out in respect of
constitutional amendments that "I figured it out once, I think if you
picked the smallest number necessary for a majority in the least
populous states, something like less than 2 percent of the population
can prevent a constitutional amendment."2 19
Moreover, if judges ignore the factual, social, and policy
considerations in cases, this means that the law does not change,
unless through legislative means. The law then continues to benefit
those whom it has already privileged while often ignoring the needs
of those who might most need its protection. Justice Kennedy foresaw
a role for the Court in advancing justice when he noted that "when
the rights of persons are violated, 'the Constitution requires redress
by the courts,' notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
decisionmaking."220

4.
Voice, Tone, and Audience
Justice Scalia seems to have enjoyed drafting dissents, as he had
a chance to express himself freely therein without worrying about
accommodating other Justices' views. He once wrote:
[Dissent] makes the practice of one's profession as a judge more
satisfying. To be able to write an opinion solely for oneself,
without the need to accommodate, to any degree whatever, the
more-or-less-differing views of one's colleagues; to address
precisely the points of law that one considers important and no
others; to express precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding,
or disbelief, or indignation that one believes the majority's
disposition should engender-that is indeed an unparalleled
pleasure. 221
He also seems to have taken pride in his dissents, noting in a
speech that he had ''hit lots of home runs in dissents, but they don't

218. See William F. Connelly Jr. & John J. Pitney Jr., How Representative Is
Congress?, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 23, 201 7), https://medium.corn/@
Brookings/how-representative-is-congress-c4605c61000d. Connelly and Pitney
note that the Framers would scorn those who argue that Congress is
unrepresentative because demographic characteristics do not mirror those of the
general population or that its decisions fail to reflect public opinion on key issues.
They do however concede that "much of the demographic mismatch between
Congress and the public has been a symptom of discrimination and unequal
opportunity." Id. However, it should be noted that Congress remains extremely
unrepresentative in respect of race and gender.
219. Senior, supra note 129.
220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (citing Schuette v. BAMN,
572 U.S. 291, 313 (2014)).
221. Antonin Scalia, Dissents, 13 OAH MAG. OF HISTORY 18, 22-23 (1998).
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make it to the scoreboard." 222 Audience and some kind of recognition
therefore seems to have been important to Scalia. A few months
before his death, he told students at St. Thomas School of Law that
he wrote his dissents "for you guys." 223 He went on: "If I write it I
know it will be in the casebook, because the professors need
something to talk about." 224 He suggested that by doing so he hoped
to preserve "what he believed to be true principles of law."2 25
Scalia's legal philosophy regarding dissents has implications in
respect to the audience he might be attempting to persuade, as well
as the sources to which he might cite in his dissents to substantiate
his points and persuade that audience. The general public would
likely have been oblivious to the nuances of Scalia's contentions that
the majority was ignoring an originalist approach or subverting a
textualist interpretation. Even in cases where he would read his
dissents aloud from the bench and the press would report on these
occasions, the public might not fully understand the essence of his
philosophical disagreements with the majority opinions unless the
case involved a salient issue like gay marriage. This suggests that
Scalia's audience must therefore have been other lawyers, judges, the
academy, and law students. He confirmed this when he noted that
opinions are too complex for the press and regular people to
understand. 22 6
Additionally, although one might expect the tone of any dissent
to convey a level of frustration that one's opinion is not being adopted
by the majority, Scalia's dissents, particularly those read from the
bench, were often scathing. A good dissent or opinion, as Ferguson

222. Heather Sackett, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Speaks at
Conference in Mountain Village, TELLURIDE DAILY PLANET (May 13, 2015),
https://www.telluridenews.com/news/artic1e_2e4e9b60-302e-57ad-92df-ceb0cd91
a6b8.html.
223. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scalia at St. Thomas: Closing Arguments, PuB.
DISCOURSE (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16501/.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Scalia did not have a high opinion of the citizenry or the press. He once
noted, ''They're just going to report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice little
old lady? And who is the defendant? Was this, you know, some scuzzy guy? And
who won? Was it the good guy that won or the bad guy? And that's all you're
going to get in a press report, and you can't blame them, you can't blame them.
Because nobody would read it if you went into the details of the law that the court
has to resolve. So you can't judge your judges on the basis of what you read in
the press." Scalia's Superficial View Sells Americans Short, HERALDNET (Oct. 25,
2006, 9:00 PM), h ttps://www .heraldnet.com/opinion/scalias-su perficial-view-sells
-americans-short/ (quoting Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia at a talk
sponsored by the National Italian American Foundation). See also Sackett, supra
note 222 (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) ("They would lose their readership
if they tried to explain the case thoroughly.").

2021]

DISSENTING FROM THE BENCH

361

has noted, addresses and responds to the opposing viewpoint. 227 This
is consistent with the Toulminian approach and classical rhetoric,
whereby one builds one's own ethos and comes across as a reasonable
person by acknowledging the limitations of one's own argument, as
well as considering and responding to opposing perspectives. 228 Many
of Scalia's bench dissents raised alternative views and approaches but
did so in ways that Ferguson notes are "entirely within the controlling
voice of the judicial speaker and with the foreknowledge that these
alternatives will submit to that speaker's own authorial
intentions." 22 9 When Scalia would canvass alternative views he often
wrote of them dismissively, minimizing their validity and treating
them with sarcasm and disparagement, as if no reasonable person
could possibly entertain such an outcome. 230 In fact, Scalia tops the
"sarcasm" index of all the Justices from 1986-2013 by a wide margin.
The index was designed by Richard Hasen, who relied on scholars'
descriptions of opinions and dissents in law reviews as "caustic" or
"sarcastic." 2 3 1 While Hasen's methodology might be questionable, the
fact that Scalia was rated as "sarcastic" or "caustic" seventy-five times
over the period 1986-2013, while the rest of the Justices combined
only had fifty-nine such references for that period, indicates a
consensus as to Justice Scalia's negative tone. 232 This tone does not
suggest that he was trying to persuade his judicial colleagues to adopt
his viewpoint. As J. Lyn Entrikin has pointed out, his dissents would
surely have been less acerbic had he intended to bring his colleagues
around to his line of thinking. 233 Instead, the dissents often read like
227. Ferguson, supra note 64, at 205 ("The goal of judgment is to subsume
difference in an act of explanation and a moment of decision.").
228. Anthony John Kunnan describes the Toulminian argument as "a method
of practical reasoning with a structured macrostructure of arguments. It has the
following six categories: the claim or assertion or conclusion which is a statement
including any qualifiers or certainty or limits, the evidence or grounds or data
that support the claim, the warrant(s) or principle or authority or reasoning
connecting the evidence to the claim, the backing or reasons or assurances or
theory, if necessary for warrants, and the rebuttal(s) or exception(s) to the
claims." Anthony John Kunnan, Test Fairness and Toulmin's Argument
Structure, 27 LANGUAGE TESTING 183, 184 (2010).
229. Ferguson, supra note 64, at 205.
230. In fact, Justice Scalia ranks the highest of all justices on the "sarcasm"
index, according to Richard L. Hasen. Richard L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic
Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 217 (2015), http://www.greenbag.org/v18n2/v18n
2_ex_post_hasen. pdf.
231. Id. at 21fr.16 (finding "unparalleled" Justice Scalia's "nastiness,
particularly directed at other Justices' opinions").
232. Id. at 216.
233. See generally J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia's
Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 201 (2017) (noting
that Scalia found professional pleasure in writing alone rather than with
colleagues and claimed to write for the purpose of law students reading his work
someday). Entrikin notes, "His dissents frequently reflected uncloaked scorn for
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a castigation, pointing out the fallacy of the majority's approach.
Rubin asserts that in dissent Scalia became "strident and
contentious, appealing to popular political sentiments that lie beyond
the boundaries of the case at issue." 234 Even Justice Ginsburg pointed
out that she had suggested that he would ''be more effective if he is
not so polemical. I'm not always successful."235
If his colleagues on the bench were not his primary audience,
neither was the general public in most cases, except perhaps on cases
with major sociological implications, such as the gay rights cases and
the ACA, as the public tends to be more concerned with the outcome
of particular cases that engage the national interest. One is left with
the conclusion that one of Scalia's intended audiences must have been
posterity. He would likely want to be remembered for his consistent
philosophy, rather than for his direct impact on his brethren or the
public.
Justice Scalia's rhetoric, vocabulary, and the sources to which he
tended to cite, also confirm that his targeted audience was the legal
academy and/or posterity. His dissents speak to the more educated
listener and reader. Part of this may be attributed to Scalia's love of
rhetoric and fondness for erudite phrases. As Paul Clement has
noted, "[h]e was willing to use an unfamiliar term, and risk losing a
lazy reader unwilling to consult the dictionary, because words have
meaning. He did not want to dilute his message by using a more
familiar but less precise word." 236 He also took pride in his use of
metaphors and memorable phrases. Robert Ivie has pointed out that
metaphors are often used by dissenters as they are a "device for
articulating a shift of perspective." 237 Scalia himself recognized that
dissents "will not be cited, and will not be remembered, unless some
quality of thought or of expression commends them to later
generations." 238

the majority. And although he has been celebrated in death as a brilliant judicial
giant, his departure from the custom ofrespectful dissent marked a turning point
in the Court's tradition of collegiality and civility." Id. at 202. She goes on to
assert, "[a]s one scholar observed, his 'dissents have not won over many
adherents, and in some areas, despite the force of his protest, he may well be on
the wrong side of history."' Id. at 203 (quoting MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND
THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT'S HISTORY AND THE NATION'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 407 (2015)).
234. Edward L. Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice,
Antonin Scalia Is (A) Great, (B) Acceptable, (C) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1105, 1130 (2008).
235. Sherman, supra note "119.
236. Paul D. Clement, Why We Read the Scalia Opinion First, 101 JUDICATURE
52, 54 (2017).
237. Ivie, supra note 36, at 51.
238. Clement, supra note 236, at 55. Clement noted, "[h]is opinions, in turn,
could send the reader to the dictionary to look up words like 'panopticon' and
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Additionally, Scalia's oral dissents often display some rhetorical
trickery in the persona he affected. The fact that he did not have to
persuade other members of the Court to sign on to the opinion allowed
him to do so; he could adopt extreme views, make esoteric word
choices, and use a more personalized style and voice. Although Scalia
expressed the opinion that the Court's decisions are too complex for
ordinary people to follow, 239 he often adopted the rhetorical persona
of the ordinary "man in the street," apparently aghast at the position
his elitist and undemocratic colleagues in the majority had adopted.
At times, therefore, he did appear to be speaking directly to
ordinary, regular people, as if he were not a member of the legal and
political elite. He accomplished this through a kind of "who do they
think they are" tone (referring to the majority) in several of his
dissents, along with the use of "folksy" language, colloquialisms, and
metaphors. As Laura Krugman Ray has pointed out, in doing so,
Scalia "attempts to position himself ... as the champion of the people,
respecting their values and speaking their language." 24 For example,
she points out that in Casey, 241 he used informal phrases like "[i]t is
beyond me," 24 2 "come to think of it," 24 3 and "even in the head of
someone like me," 244 as well as accusing his colleagues of engaging in
a "verbal shell game." 245 In EPA v. EME Homer City, he noted that,
as one of his grandchildren would say, "well, duh!" 246 Similarly, in
his dissent in Obergefell, he quoted from the majority opinion which
referred to the Court's "constitutional imperatives [to] define a

°

'atavistic,' as well as allusions like 'Cheops' Pyramid,' and 'Marquis of
Queensberry rules."' Id. at 54.
239. Larry Kramer notes that "[c]onstitutional law is indeed complex, because
legitimating judicial authority has offered the legal system an excuse to
emphasize technical requirements of precedent and formal argument that
necessarily complicated matters. But this complexity was created by the Court
for the Court and is itself a product of judicializing constitutional law." Larry
Kramer, The People v. Judicial Activism: Who has the Last Word on the
Constitution?, Bos. REV. (Feb. 1, 2004), http://bostonreview.net/us/larry-kramerwe-people.
240. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 229 (2002).
241. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
242. Id. at 997 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 994.
244. Id. at 998.
245. Id. at 987.
246. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 06:59-7:04, Part Two, EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (No. 12-1182),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1182. The written dissent is also replete
with phrases like "[t]he majority reaches its result ('Look Ma, no hands!')," EPA
v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 525 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), and "[c]all it 'pin the tail on the donkey,"' id. at 539.
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liberty'' 247 and followed it up with a bemused and colloquial "Huh?"248
He also described his colleagues as a "select, patrician, highly
unrepresentative panel of nine," 249 in some ways distracting his
readers and listeners from the fact that he was a member of that
select panel and was a graduate of Harvard Law and a distinguished
law professor prior to being elevated to the Court.2 50 His use (or
creation) of terms such as "jiggery-pokery" 251 to describe the
majority's reasoning in upholding the ACA sounds quaint and
amusing but draws attention away from the fact that without the
protection of the ACA millions of Americans would find themselves
without health insurance. Additionally, he criticized his colleagues
for asserting that "the context and structure of the Act compel [it] to
depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the
pertinent statutory phrase." 252 He derided this as "pure applesauce"
and combined this phrase with a more erudite reference when he
went on to note "[i]mpossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on
the Affordable Care Act!" 253 Some commentators have claimed that
"[t]hese-typical--cheap-shot one-liners are the stuff of political
attack TV ads, not of persuasive legal writing."254
VI. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S RESPONSIVE APPROACH: HER
CONTEMPORARY AUDIENCE AND RECOGNITION OF SOCIETAL CHANGES
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society."
Justice Cardozo255

Although Justice Ginsburg was one of the Justices known for
reading more dissents aloud from the bench than other Justices, she

247.
248.
249.
250.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 719 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 718.
See Steven A. Rosenberg, Antonin Scalia Remembered for Close Ties to
Harvard, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:52 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2016/02/14/scalia -remembered-for-close- ties-harvard/qL 7tdJAUrDJ GQK
TN9ue0yH/story.html.
251. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 497.
253. Id. at 500, 507.
254. Simon Lazarus, The Scalia Problem: It Wasn't Originalism or
Textualism-It Was Trumpism, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2018), https://prospect.org/
justice/scalia-problem-originalism-textualism-trumpism/; see also Lincoln
Caplan, Forget the Tone. It's Dissent That Matters, WASH. POST (July 6, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/07 /06/forget-the- toneits-dissent-tha t- ma tters/712efea0-6008-4f92-91d2-d2f78c2 l l 3b6/ (opining that
"Scalia's dissents may be too sharp and his arguments too impassioned").
255. BENJAMJN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
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nevertheless appeared not to take that responsibility lightly. 256 She
once cited Justice Scalia's words in noting, "[w]hen history
demonstrates that one of the Court's decisions has been a truly
horrendous mistake, it is comforting ... to look back and realize that
at least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly and gave voice,
often eloquent voice, to their concern." 257
Giving voice to one's concerns presupposes a level of clarity in
writing, yet Ginsburg's opinions have been singled out as among the
most complex by Owens and Wedeking, whereas Justice Scalia's are
often rated among the clearest. 258 However, the LIWC methodology
used by Owens and Wedeking analyzes "attentional focus,
emotionality, social relationships, thinking styles" and other features
oflanguage that combine to measure "cognitive complexity." 259 When
one considers those factors in respect of Ginsburg's dissents,
particularly the factors of emotionality and social relationships, one
may see why Ginsburg's dissents rank as the most complex. Unlike
Scalia, Ginsburg was not a strict textualist. Rather, she tended to
look at the congressional intent and the impact of the case on the
parties and on other people in the position of the parties, particularly
women. 260 Additionally, Philip Tetlock and others have noted that
language scored as more complex tends to "interpret events in
multidimensional terms and to integrate a variety of evidence in
arriving at decisions." 261 Ginsburg incorporated a lot of factual
testimony into her opinions and dissents, including testimony before
256. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7 (asserting that she has read
approximately 10 percent of her dissents from the bench, more than any other
Justice).
257. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 5.
258. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1043. The authors aver that
"among all the justices in our sample, Justice Ginsburg's opinions were, by a
significant margin, the most complex. Indeed, her average complexity score of
3.28 is over twice that of the mean justice (Brennan = 1.43), and roughly four
times greater than those of Justices Scalia and Breyer." Id. at 1044. This may
be because Justice Scalia focused on bright line rules ("the rule of law is a law of
rules"), which are more easily communicated. Subsequent research by Ryan C.
Black shows the situation may also be more complex, in that liberal Justices tend
to write clearer opinions when public opinion is skewing more conservative and
vice versa. See RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THEIR
AUDIENCES 137-38 (2016). Note that Black is writing about majority opinions
rather than dissents.
259. Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of
Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & Soc.
PSYCH. 24, 24, 32 (2010).
260. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Hearing the Voices of Individual Women and
Men: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 635, 635-39 (1998).
261. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Supreme Court Decision Making: Cognitive Style
as a Predictor of Ideological Consistency of Voting, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCH. 1227, 1228 (1985). Neither Scalia nor Ginsburg appear in the study as
neither one was on the Court at that time.
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Congressional Committees, facts from the district court case rather
than simply the facts received from the appellate court, as well as
general social and policy-based facts and studies. 262 This stands in
contrast to a more rule-based approach like Justice Scalia's, which is
dismissive of the facts and applies the rule, no matter the outcome.
Another factor that sheds some insight into the complexity of
Ginsburg's opinions is her word choice, as Gruenfeld has noted,
"[l]anguage that scores as least complex relies on 'one-dimensional,
evaluative rules in interpreting events' in which actors make
decisions 'on the basis of only a few salient items of information."' 26 3
Interestingly, when one analyzes the oral version of dissents read
from the bench using rhetorical clarity measures, such as the Flesch
Kincaid and other readability tests, Justice Ginsburg's dissents are
clearer than Justice Scalia's in terms of the levels of readability, the
shortness of the sentences (which generally do not exceed two lines),
the accessible vocabulary, the directness of the prose, and the clarity
of the facts and examples provided. This all suggests that, in contrast
to Justice Scalia's focus on posterity and the academy, Justice
Ginsburg's audience for her oral dissents appeared to be the broader
public (via the press) and the litigants (including people who may not
be actual parties but who may be similarly impacted by the Court's
decisions). Her audience was also clearly the Court itself and
Congress where appropriate, as she spoke directly to them on
occas10n.
The following Subparts will explore several of Ginsburg's most
prominent dissents with a view towards analyzing the kinds of cases
in which she read her dissents aloud, her goals in doing so, and the
audiences to whom the dissents are addressed. In canvassing the
notion of audience, this Article will explore what the Justice herself
said about her dissents, as well as the tone of those dissents and the
authorities to which she cited, in both the oral and written versions.
The Article will also help elucidate what these dissents tell us about
the Justice's views on the role of the Court.264

262. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (discussing
congressional testimony); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 643 (2009) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (discussing district court record).
263. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1039 (quoting Deborah H.
Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Supreme
Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCH. 5, 5 (1995)).
264. In an interview, Ginsburg noted, '"The Supreme Court doesn't have an
agenda of its own,' she said, adding that 'it's a totally reactive institution, it
depends upon people bringing cases before us that represent the issues."'
Caroline Kelly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: This Time in History Will Be Seen as 'an
Aberration', CNN (Oct. 3, 2019, 10:18 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/03/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-us-historyaberration/index.html.
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A. Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinions as Advocacy: Context,
Audiences, Rhetoric, Tone, Purpose, and Authorities
''.As we know, the role of the others for whom the utterance is
constructed is extremely great . ... From the very beginning, the
speaker expects a response from them, an active responsive
understanding. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were,
in anticipation of encountering this response. ''2 65

An important foundational question is: In what circumstances or
context do Justices choose to orally dissent? Blake and Hacker
hypothesized that this occurs when there is profound disagreement
on the outcome of cases, not only on legal or policy grounds, but also
based on ideological differences among the dissenting Justice and the
majority. 266 The authors also posit that the likelihood of dissenting
from the bench increases in cases of "high salience," and when the
case is closely decided, such as in a 5:4 split. 267 Although the authors
found that their original hypothesis regarding ideological splits did
not prove to be the most powerful motivator in a Justice choosing to
orally dissent,268 that factor may now have changed, as the Court has
become more politically divided in the ten years since the study was
conducted. When analyzing my results, as reflected in Appendix B,
Justice Ginsburg appeared more likely to orally dissent in cases
involving some form of discrimination, whether that was in respect to
voting rights, 269 Title VII, 210 affirmative action, 271 class actions, 272 or
access to contraception or abortion. 273 Given the Justice's background
and judicial philosophies, these factors do not appear to be accidental.
Moreover, whom she is addressing and how she is addressing
them, is also salient. In a recent interview, Justice Ginsburg was
asked how easy it had been making the transition from an advocate
to a Justice. Somewhat surprisingly, Ginsburg replied, "I think I'm
still an advocate." 274 She went on to point out that when she writes
dissents, she was "always hopeful that [her] advocacy will
265. M. M. Bakhtin, The Problem of Speech Genres, in SPEECH GENRES AND
OTHER LATE ESSAYS 60, 94 (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W.
McGee trans., 1986).
266. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 4-5.
267. Id. at 9-10. My study confirmed this to be the case as fifteen out of
eighteen of Ginsburg's oral dissents occurred in cases where there was a 5:4 split.
The authors also found there are disincentives to orally dissent if one is the Chief
Justice or a freshman Justice. Id. at 10.
268. See id. at 19.
269. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
270. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
271. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
272. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
273. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127 (2007).
274. Kelly, supra note 264.
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persuade." 275 Ginsburg, like any good lawyer, is still mindful of her
audience. "[I]t's a smaller audience," she noted, "[t]here's only nine of
us."276 Because Ginsburg was extremely cognizant of her colleagues
on the bench, as well as the fact that today's dissent may evolve into
a future majority opinion, her dissents sought to engage and
persuade, which in turn influenced her word choices and her tone. All
of these are very different from Justice Scalia's dissents, whose
rhetoric often seemed designed to further alienate his fellow Justices
on the Court. Ginsburg often began her dissents from the bench with
a cordial: "Hello, fellow members of the Court."2 77 Presumably she
would have seen and greeted those fellow members prior to walking
into the Courtroom, so addressing them personally in this way
appears to be an attempt to engage them directly and ensure they are
paying attention. Her language may also have helped to reassure
those present and those who read about the oral dissent that the
Court is an institution capable of handling dissent; and that even an
oral dissent read aloud from the bench will not fracture it because the
Court is still a unified body.
Kenneth Burke once defined rhetoric as "the use of language in
such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or
reader." 278 If one considers an oral dissent as a particular "rhetorical
situation" to use Lloyd Bitzer's phrase, 279 then one must consider the
context in which Ginsburg chose to orally dissent, to whom her
dissents were addressed, and how she used language, tone, and
specific authorities in an effort to persuade and become a "mediator
of change." 280 One must also consider if the audience(s) for her oral

275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See e.g., Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 9:44-9:47, Ricci v.
DeStefano,
No.
07-1428
(U.S.
June
29,
2009),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428; Press Release, Supreme Court of the
United States, Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death of
Associate
Justice
Ruth
Bader
Ginsburg
(Sept.
19,
2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/
pr_09-19-20
(listing opinions of other Justices describing Justice Ginsburg as "the essence of
grace, civility and dignity," a "superb judge who gave her best ... whether in
agreement or disagreement," and who was always "civil, principled, [and]
respectful" in her disagreements with other Justices).
278. KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT 210 (3d ed. 1968).
279. Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1 (1968).
Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation as one where "rhetoric is a mode of altering
reality, ... by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the
mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into
existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action,
is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is always
persuasive." Id. at 4.
280. Id. at 4-5.
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spoken dissents were different from those who read her much longer
written dissenting opinions.
Justice Ginsburg was far more attuned to a contemporary and
broader audience than Justice Scalia. She was also not shy about
communicating directly with that audience. Therefore, overall, the
tone of Ginsburg's oral dissents remained fairly polite, unlike the
sometimes shrill tone of Justice Scalia's. As Cynthia Fuchs Epstein
has noted, "[h]er style has always been very ameliorative, very
conscious of etiquette." 281 While she was not hesitant to tell the Court
where or how it has gone wrong in its majority opinion, she usually
did so in a polite and restrained manner by urging Congress to act, if
appropriate, or warning the Court that its decision would not stand,
as it ignored the practical realities of people's lives. 28 2 She ascribed
to Brennan's view that Justices have "an obligation to bring their
individual intellects to bear on the issues that come before the
Court ... [W]here significant and deeply held disagreement exists,
members of the Court have a responsibility to articulate it." 283
This sense of responsibility is an essential part of what Lani
Guinier refers to as demosprudence. 284 Guinier characterizes this as
occurring when a Justice is strongly opposed to the majority's position
and the dissent is intended to "inspire nonjudicial actors to
participate in some form of collective problem solving." 285 This
presupposes that the dissent has a ready audience which will be
responsive to, and engage with, the dissenting opinion. As Post has
noted, "[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of

281. Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court,
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/
3lscotus.html.
282. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633, 1640 (2018)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's opinion striking down a
provision of the National Labor Relations Act ignores the reality of employeremployee inequality that the Act was designed to mitigate, while signaling for
Congressional correction of the Court's decision); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 645--46, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(contending the majority's interpretation of what qualifies as unlawful
employment discrimination under Title VII discounts the realities of the
workplace and calling on Congress to act to correct the Court's ruling).
283. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, in THE GREAT DISSENTS
OF THE "LoNE DISSENTER": JUSTICE JESSE W. CARTER'S TwENTY TuMlJLTUOUS
YEARS ON THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT xxxv, xliii (David B. Oppenheimer &
Allan Brotsky eds., 2010). Ginsburg has claimed the right to intervene, noting,
"[w]hen a Justice is of the firm view that the majority got it wrong, she is free to
say so in dissent. I take advantage of that prerogative, when I think it important,
as do my colleagues." RUTH BADER GINSBURG ET AL., MY OWN WORDS xviii (2016).
284. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 16.
285. Id.
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rights and law; they are participants within that debate." 286
However, if a Justice's goal was to reach a broader public audience so
as to engage them as participants, an oral dissent must be accessible
to that audience and will therefore not be too erudite or spend too
much time citing largely inaccessible or incomprehensible case law.
Guinier's construct of demosprudence is embodied in Ginsburg's
dissenting jurisprudence. Ginsburg's oral dissents show that she did
not consider the Court's role "to close what has been open," to use
Wetlaufer's phrase; 287 rather she used her position on the Court to
engage others in conversation-whether those others were Congress
or the public. Because of her own background and experiences,
Ginsburg was acutely aware of the exclusion of and discrimination
against women. Despite attaining the distinction of being at the top
of her class, she struggled to find a job. 288 She was rejected for a
Supreme Court clerkship and only attained her first position through
the machinations of one of her professors from Columbia. 289 Her work
with the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU'') centered on
litigating gender discrimination. 290 Her own background thus
provided Ginsburg with an ethos with her audience. She had
credibility because those who have been excluded by the legal system
know that at one point, she suffered along with them. Ginsburg was
acutely attuned to any form of discrimination and exclusion, and she
endeavored to engage her colleagues on the bench in judicial problemsolving on these issues, using a form of narrative and feminist
practical reasoning. 2 9 1 It is not surprising, therefore, that many of
the cases in which she issued strongly worded dissents from the bench
involved some form of discrimination. These included several Title
VII and equal protection claims. 29 2

286. Robert Post, Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the
Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 B.U. L. REV. 581,
582 (2009).
287. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1564.
288. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_
bader_ginsburg.
289. See id.; Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of
Gender Equality, Dies at 87, NPR (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-gins burg-champion -of-gender-equality
-dies-at-87.
290. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, supra note 288.
291. See Bartlett, supra note 209, for a discussion of feminist reasoning.
Bartlett notes, "[w]hen feminists 'do law,' they do what other lawyers do: they
examine the facts of a legal issue or dispute, they identify the essential features
of those facts, they determine what legal principles should guide the resolution
of the dispute, and they apply those principles to the facts. This process unfolds
not in a linear, sequential, or strictly logical manner, but rather in a pragmatic,
interactive manner." Id. at 836.
292. See supra notes 102---06, 268---72 and accompanying text.
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The fact that someone who had herself experienced
discrimination gave voice to those who have been discriminated
against is important. Erin Rand has noted that "a dissent written
from a position of institutional power can provide recognition to a
group that feels otherwise unheard and disenfranchised." 293
Moreover, Ginsburg was not a bland face of institutional power; she
was someone with whom her audience felt a kinship-hence the RBG
dolls, memes, and Halloween costumes. The relationship between
Ginsburg and her audience was symbiotic, reciprocal, mutual, and
responsive.
Just as Ginsburg "recognized" the victims of
discrimination in many of her dissents by voicing their concerns and
using the personal pronoun "you," 2 9 4 so too did her nonlegal audience
in turn "recognize" her by paying homage to her in contemporary pop
culture and in responding to her dissents, knowing she had "walked
the walk." In turn, Ginsburg's recognition of, and identification with,
her audience was illustrated by multiple factors. First, she signaled
to her audience what was to come by walking into the Courtroom
wearing her special dissenting collar. 29 5 Adorning herself with this
symbol ensured that the assembled press corps would immediately
pay attention and report on Ginsburg's words. She thus reached a
broader audience she would not otherwise reach if she did not convey
a sense of drama and instill the expectation that a performance was
about to occur. She also signaled to her followers that she was
performing for them by reading her dissent aloud. Additionally, the
fact that Ginsburg intended for her words to reach a broad audience
was evidenced by the fact that she incorporated many clearly
understandable facts and statistics as well as sociological authorities
in her dissents, rather than limiting herself to solely legal ones. 296 In
doing so, she reminded the Court and the public that the Court's
decisions were affecting the lives of real people.
According to Smith, a published dissent "may galvanize popular
mobilization against unpopular decisions." 297 One such example of an
audience reaction that took place as a direct response to Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby occurred when activists, outraged
at the exception to the ACA's contraception mandate that the
majority carved out for Hobby Lobby, took it upon themselves to
strategically place copies of Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby

293. Erin J. Rand, Fear the Frill: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Uncertain
Futurity of Feminist Judicial Dissent, 101 Q. J. SPEECH 72, 78 (2015) (citing J.
Louis Campbell, III, The Spirit of Dissent, 66 JUDICATURE 304, 311 (1983)).
294. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 40.
295. See Safia Samee Ali, Justice Ginsburg Wears "Dissent" Collar Following
Contentious Election,
NBC NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2016,
7:46 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/justice-ginsburg-wearsdissent-collar-following-contentious-election -n68 l 5 71.
296. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 43-44.
297. Smith, supra note 71, at 532.
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stores. 298 They also included copies of the Seneca Falls Address and
other texts on emancipation and women's rights.299 It is interesting
to contrast this approach, which took the form of a robust reaction to
a dissent occurring shortly after the dissent has been issued, with
Justice Scalia's notion of a canonical dissent that will reverberate
some time later in history. Ginsburg seemed more concerned with
the "here and now" impact of her dissenting opinions.
The strong reaction by members of the public to Ginsburg's
dissents was not surprising. Michael Wells has suggested that when
judges rely on sociological sources, their opinions appear to find more
favor with the general public than when they rely on purely legal
sources. 300 He notes that despite the fact that legal legitimacy
indicates more fidelity to the law, sociological legitimacy "aims
directly at public acceptance and its benefits can be grasped in the
short term." 301 In this sense it "provides the public with a rationale
it prefers." 302 Additionally, sociological concepts are generally more
relatable than principles of textualism or originalism, which were
more often relied on by Justice Scalia. But Ginsburg's audience was
not narrow. She had multiple audiences: specifically, her colleagues
on the bench whom she often addressed directly, the litigants and the
general public who felt heard by her, and the academy and posterity.
Many of these audiences were often specifically addressed in her
dissents.
For Katie Gibson, Ginsburg's "judicial rhetoric is
transformative: it ... shifts the language of the law to legitimate
voices, experiences, and rights of groups traditionally excluded by the
rhetoric of the law."sos
Justice Ginsburg appeared to ultimately believe that the law was
flexible enough to recognize and respond to social realities, and it is
those social realities on which she often focused during her dissents.
Unlike Justice Scalia's strict adherence to a narrow reading of the
text, Ginsburg asserted that facts matter, and she endeavored to
communicate that belief to a broader audience than just her
colleagues. This belief and methodology appear to be rooted in a
feminist practical reasoning approach. Katherine Bartlett described
298. Rand, supra note 293, at 80.
299. Id.
300. See Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court
Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011 (2007). Wells asserts that "political and
social aims may drive the outcomes of hard cases even when they receive
comparatively little attention in the opinions." Id. at 1013-14. Wells defines the
concepts of legal versus sociological legitimacy as follows: "[l]egal legitimacy
requires that an opinion candidly state the reasons for the outcome. Sociological
legitimacy is achieved by an opinion that secures public acceptance of the Court's
rulings." Id. at 1014.
301. Id. at 1024.
302. Id.
303. Katie L. Gibson, In Defense of Women's Rights: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Judicial Dissent, 35 WOMEN'S STUD. COMM. 123, 124 (2012).
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such an approach as resting on the understanding that an effective
resolution of a legal problem depends "on the basis of the intricacies
of each specific factual context."304 The practical reasoning approach
also incorporates the views and perspectives of those who have
traditionally been considered "outsiders" by the law.305 Kathryn
Stanchi and Linda Berger have pointed out that "[f]eminist practical
reasoning rejects the notion that there is a monolithic source for
reason, values and justifications."306 This way of viewing the law
stands in stark contrast to the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia who
believed that there was a general inherently valid body of authority:
the Constitution as established by the Framers, the text, or
established precedent.307
By adopting the practical reasoning approach in several of her
oral dissents, Ginsburg pointed out the injustices being done by the
majority and marshalled support for viewing the issue before the
Court from the perspectives of those of whom the law has not
traditionally taken notice. Ginsburg often pointed out the impact of
the Court's decision not only on the litigants, but on others in the
same position. This reaching out beyond solely the litigants before
the Court and addressing the entire community of legal and nonlegal
actors is important, as it illuminated Ginsburg's acknowledgment of
"lived realities." It was a recognition of the people who were similarly
situated to the petitioners or who cared about the issues that were
before the Court. Ginsburg thus showed these people that she heard
and understood their position and recognized the realities of their
situation. As few people take the time to read a Supreme Court
opinion and dissent, 308 having the press report on a dissent read from
the bench communicates the opinion to a far broader audience-and

304. Bartlett, supra note 209, at 851.
305. See generally LAW AND OUTSIDERS: NORMS, PROCESSES AND 'OTHERING' IN
THE TwENTY-FlRST CENTURY (Cian C. Murphy & Penny Green eds., 2011) (the
editors select thirteen essays from leading young scholars to demonstrate "the
way in which rules and processes are contributing to the creation of twenty-firstcentury 'others"' in different areas).
306. Kathryn M. Stanchi et al., Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments
Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 3, 15 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016).
307. See John S. Baker, Jr., et al., Justice Scalia on Federalism and
Separation of Powers, Panel Discussion Before 2016 National Lawyers
Convention (Nov. 17, 2016), in 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 57, 65 (2017) (John S. Baker
speaking).
308. See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: An Opinion is Worth at Least
a Tlwusand Words (Corrected), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2018, 12:03 PM),
h ttps ://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/empirical-scotus-an-opinion-is-worth-atleast-a-thousand-words/.
Feldman's analysis has shown that these have
increased in length in recent years with the average majority opinion coming in
at around 2,800 words in 1955 to an average of 6,300 words in 2014. Id. Thus,
it is unlikely the public would spend the time reading them.
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in far more accessible language-than the published dissent.
Moreover, the dissent was more likely to be reported on more widely
because of the popular persona that Ginsburg created that has been
augmented by props like her famous dissenting collar.
As someone who was trying to make the system more responsive
to social change and bring about changes to the status quo, Ginsburg
was more likely to focus on the facts of a particular case, or changed
social circumstances, to illustrate that having recourse solely to
existing precedent may entrench current inequalities. 309 This is
consistent with the Aristotelian approach to argument, which asserts
that history and context matter and that facts are extremely
important. 310 In focusing on facts, Ginsburg was making particular
rhetorical choices, wherein she often used the narratives of those
particularly impacted by the Court's decision to communicate her
opposition to the majority opinion. As Berger has pointed out, this
type of "rhetoric is able to accommodate diversity and imagine
change, based in human experience, sensitive to middle grounds, and
in opposition to all-or-nothing judgments."311 Hence it is no surprise
that her dissents are the most complex of the Justices in Owens and
Wedeking's study.
Aligning herself with the feminist narrative approach, which
presents the facts of the case as a story, compels both the author and
the reader to acknowledge the impact that the Court's decisions will
have on the subject of the story. 312 Given how keenly attuned to
stories of law's "outsiders" Ginsburg was, several trends emerge in
Ginsburg's dissents: (1) They were more likely to occur in cases
involving discrimination; she emphasized the facts of the case,
particularly if they were egregious; (2) Her opinions were more
accessible to the lay reader, (i.e., easily readable) as they were
designed to speak directly to the people who had similar experiences
as the litigants; (3) They often relied on sources other than traditional
legal precedent to illustrate changing societal needs and expectations;
and, (4) They urged Congress to act (if appropriate) or warned the
Court that its majority opinion did not settle the matter.

309. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 6----7.
310. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric''.· A Place to
Stand, 16 LEGAL WRITING 3, 4S-49 (2010).
311. Id. at 12.
312. See generally Linda L. Berger et al., Learning from Feminist Judgments:
Lessons in Language and Advocacy, 98 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 57 (2019)
(describing how feminist judgments often weave in the "stories of individuals
affected by injustice").
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B. Emphasizing the Facts and the Implications of the Majority's
Decision
As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have noted, telling
the stories of litigants is an important undertaking. 313 Facts are often
interpreted by the hearer. Amsterdam and Bruner argue:
[T]he framing and adjudication of legal issues necessarily rest
upon interpretation. Results cannot be arrived at entirely by
deductive, analytic reasoning or by the rules of induction ....
There always remains the "wild card" of all interpretation-the
consideration of context, that ineradicable element in meaning
making. And the deepest, most impenetrable feature of context
lies in the minds and culture of those involved in fashioning an
interpretation."314
Ginsburg appears to have instinctively recognized this,
particularly in respect to cases involving discrimination, where her
practical, pragmatic, fact-based approach to legal problem-solving
was evident in multiple dissents. In the Title VII cases for example,
she pointed to the context in asserting "Title VII was meant to govern
real world employment practices and that world is what the court
ignores today."3 15 In Coleman,3 16 a case involving alleged violations
of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), she argued that:
The Act was designed to promote women's opportunities to live
balanced lives at home having gainful employment.... The
best way to protect women against losing their jobs because of
pregnancy or childbirth, Congress determined was not to order
leaves for women only, for that would deter employers from
hiring them."317
She placed emphasis on the facts and context of the case and
statute when she noted that "Congress received evidence from
individuals and organizations documenting pervasive discrimination
against women based on pregnancy or the potential to become
pregnant." 318 She went on to point out "a woman's childbearing
capacity and attendant myths about motherhood and women's lack of

313. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw: How
COURTS RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE
UNDERSTAND THE LAW-AND OURSELVES 283 (2000).
314. Id. at 287.
315. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:44-7:51, Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), https://www.oyez.org/cases/
2006/05-107 4.
316. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
317. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:25-1:03, Part Two, Coleman v. Ct.
of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (No. 10-1016), https://www.oyez.org/cases/
2011/10-1016.
318. Id. at 1:15-1:28.
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commitment to work underlie the historic and not yet banished
discrimination against women in gainful employment."3 19 Similarly,
in Nassar, 320 a case involving a claim for constructive discharge and
retaliation after alleged discrimination and harassment by a
supervisor against the complainant doctor, one could almost see her
imagined public audience nodding along when she described how "[a]s
anyone with employment experience can easily grasp, in-charge
employees authorized to assign and control subordinate employees'
daily work are aided in accomplishing the harassment by the
superintending position in which their employer places them, and for
that reason, the employer is properly held responsible for their
misconduct."3 21

1.

The Broader Accessibility of Her Oral Dissents

Oral dissents are often reported in the popular press, especially
when Ginsburg dissented from the bench.3 22 Knowing that she had
to condense often lengthy written dissents to a brief ten-minute oral
version, Ginsburg and other Justices who orally dissented had to
choose their focus and determine which authorities would best and
most accessibly convey their point. As a result, her message was often
extremely direct, given its brevity and the minimal cites to precedent.
Additionally, Ginsburg's oral dissents often extended to a
consideration of the broader implications of the Court's decisions. For
example, in Epic Systems, 323 Ginsburg focused on the very practical
costs involved in bringing an individual case for overtime pay against
the company. The case involved the rights of workers to bring claims
against their employer as a collective action after they had signed
contracts agreeing to individual arbitration and waiving their rights
to benefit from collective proceedings. 324 Ginsburg pointed out that
"[t]he expenses entailed in seeking redress and the risk of employer
retaliation would likely dissuade most workers from seeking redress
alone .... [F]or workers striving to gain from their employer's decent
terms and conditions of employment there is strength in numbers." 325
She cited calculations that showed that workers would likely "spend
$200,000 to recover only $1,867.02 in overtime pay and an equivalent

319. Id. at 2:47-3:02.
320. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
321. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 3:52-4:18, Part Two, Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (No. 12-484), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2012/12-484.
322. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 2.
323. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
324. Id. at 1619.
325. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:19-0:34, 1:37-1:48, Part Two, Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2017/16-285.
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amount in liquidated damages." 326 She went on to note that "[t]he
inevitable result of today's decision [is that] there will be huge
underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance
the well-being of vulnerable workers." 327 In the written dissent, she
also performed an historical and text-based analysis of the relevant
statutes and critiqued the majority extensively for its inappropriate
use of the ejusdem generis canon.3 28 Needless to say, this canon did
not warrant a mention in the oral dissent, which was aimed at the
press and a more popular, less erudite, audience.
In Shelby County v. Holder, 329 Ginsburg began her oral dissent
with the following premise, describing the context within which the
case unfolded: "First, race-based voting discrimination still exists, no
one doubts that." 330 She went on to painstakingly describe facts that
illustrated just how much of a problem it still is, noting:
Over a span of more than 20 months, the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees held 21 hearings heard from scores of
witnesses, received numerous investigative reports and other
documentation showing that serious and widespread
intentional discrimination persists in covered jurisdictions. 331
In her dissent, Ginsburg went into extensive factual detail to
show that racial discrimination was still a congressionally recognized
problem and that the Voting Rights Act (''VRA'') was still necessary
to police redistricting and racial gerrymandering when she pointed
out:

In all, the legislative records filled more than 15,000 pages,
Representative Sensenbrenner, then the Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, described the record supporting the
authorization as one of the most extensive considerations of any
piece of legislation that the United States Congress had dealt
with in the 27 and a half years he had served in the House.
The Reauthorization passed the House by a vote of 39O-to-33.

326. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
327. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:07-7:20, Part Two, Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16285; see also Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (''The
inevitable result of today's decision will be the underenforcement of federal and
state statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.").
328. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
329. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
330. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:06-0:13, Part Two, Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/1296.
331. Id. at 3:05-3:26.
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The vote in the Senate was 98-to-0.
President Bush signed the reauthorization a week after he
received it, noting the need for further work in the fight against
injustice and calling the extension an example of our continued
commitment to a united America where every person is treated
with dignity and respect.aa2
Likewise, in her oral dissent in National Federation u.
Sebelius, 333 a case involving the constitutionality of the ACA, she
pointed out the very practical, relatable fact that in 2009,
approximately fifty million people were uninsured. She noted that
"Congress was aware that the vast majority of those people lack
insurance not by choice ...."3 34 Her written dissent was more erudite
as she referred to the Framers enacting the Commerce Clause in
response to "the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution
itself."335 She cited to Madison's papers and a letter from George
Washington to Madison, as well as Federalist No. 34 to support her
position. 336 Her popular audience might be surprised by this.

2. An Acknowledgment of Changing Societal Needs and
Practical Realities
Ginsburg viewed the access to contraception case, Hobby
Lobby,33 7 and the abortion case, Carhart,3 38 as cases involving
discrimination against women because they denied women access to
the full range of reproductive rights. In Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg
described how "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation, ... has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives." 339 She went even further
332. Id. at 3:27-4:22.
333. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 589 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
334. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:22-7:34, Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 589 (2011) (No. 111-393), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2011/11-393; see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 592.
335. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 599 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 244, 245 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
336. See id. at 600-01 (citing language in support of a centralized national
government equipped with the power to adapt to future societal changes).
337. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In the [majority's] view, [the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act] demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious
beliefs no matter the impact ... [felt by] thousands of women employed by [such
corporations).").
338. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170-71 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Court's decision that ''blesses [abortion restrictions]
with no exception safeguarding a woman's health" as "alarming'').
339. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 741 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
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in Carhart, noting that challenges to the Partial Birth Abortion Act
''hone-in on a woman's autonomy to decide for herself." 340 This,
Ginsburg argued, was an example of the Court trying to "shield □ the
woman by denying her any choice in the matter and this way of
protecting women recalls ancient notions about women's place in
society ... ideas that have long since been discredited." 341
In
Ledbetter,3 42 an equal pay case, Ginsburg chided the Court for failing
to "comprehend or [being] indifferent to the insidious way in which
women can be victims of pay discrimination." 343 She pointed out the
very practical and relatable fact that "[a]n employee like Ledbetter
trying to succeed in a male dominated workplace in a job filled only
by men before she was hired, understandably maybe anxious to avoid
making waves."3 44 Likewise, in Fisher,3 4 5 an affirmative action case,
she asserted, "I have several times explained why government actors
including state universities need not blind themselves to the still
lingering everyday evident effects of centuries of law sanctioned
inequality."346 The metaphor that she employed in Ricci3 47 aptly
summed up the Court's aversion to taking practical realities into
account. It is, she claimed, "[l]ike the chess player who tries to win
by sweeping the opponent's pieces off the table, the Court simply
shuts this reality from view." 348 In Texas v. Southwestern Medical
Center,3 4 9 she chided that the "Court shows little regard for trial
judges who must instruct juries in Title VII cases in which plaintiffs
allege both status-based discrimination and retaliation. Nor is the
Court concerned about the capacity of jurors to follow instructions
conforming to today's decision." 350 Again in Ricci she scolded the
majority:
"Congress
endeavored
to
promote
equal
opportunity.... The damage today's decision does to that objective is
untold." 351
340. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 9:13---9:17, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 682 (2007) (No. 05-380), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-380.
341. Id. at 13:12-13:34.
342. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
343. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 4:01--4:12, Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074),
https://www .oyez.org/cases/2006/05-107 4.
344. Id. at 8:22-8:37.
345. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
346. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 2:35-2:49, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/ll345.
347. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
348. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 16:00-16:10, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557 (2009) (No. 07-1428), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428.
349. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
350. Id. at 383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
351. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 19:27-19:40, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557 (2009) (No. 07-1428), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428.
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Ginsburg once again reminded the Court that context is
important in National Federation, a case involving the ACA.352 She
pointed out that "[t]he provision of health care is today a concern of
national dimension, just as the provision of old-age and survivors'
benefits was in the 1930's." 353 In citing to a blog post, she raised the
practical consideration that "when hospitals divert time and
resources to provide uncompensated care, the quality of care the
hospitals deliver to those with insurance drops significantly."354 She
went on to remind her audience that "[a]ll of us will need health care,
some sooner, some later, but we can't tell when, where or how dire
our need will be. A healthy 21-year-old, for example, may tomorrow
be the victim of an accident .... In the fullness of time, today's young
and healthy will become society's old and infirm."355

3. Firing A Shot Across the Bow-A Call to Congressional
Action
Her fellow Justices on the Court, the litigants themselves, and
the public, were not Justice Ginsburg's only audiences. In several of
her dissents she addressed herself to Congress directly. In Epic
Systems she urged that "Congressional action is urgently needed in
order to correct the Court's elevation of the Arbitration Act over
workers' right to act in concert."356 Ginsburg's exhortation to
Congress was a familiar one. It is one that she made in Ledbetter,
which resulted in Congress enacting the Fair Pay Act shortly
thereafter. 357 Ginsburg did not pretend that she was not addressing
Congress directly. When she visited Harvard to give a talk there,
then-Dean Elena Kagan asked Justice Ginsburg to describe her
intended audience in Ledbetter. Ginsburg replied: "[I]t was Congress.
Speaking to Congress, I said, 'You did not mean what the Court said.
So fix it.'"358
Some of Ginsburg's dissents seem to reflect a desire to create an
antidiscrimination canon. She conveyed a sense of urgency, that the

352. Id. at 530.
353. Id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 594 (citing Sarah Kliff, High Uninsured Rates Can Kill You-Even
If You Have Coverage, WASH. POST (May 7, 2012), https://www.washington
post.com/blogs/ezra -klein/post/%20high-uninsured-rates-can-kill-you -even- ifyou-have-coverage/2012/%2005/07 /glQALNHN8T_print.html).
355. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 2:57-3:16, 4:20-4:28, Part Three, Nat'l
Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-393),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393.
356. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 7:20-7:33, Part Two, Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16285.
357. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5.
358. Quoted in Lani Guinier, Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,
supra note 72, at 439.
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situation must be remedied now. Her dissents embody a commitment
to the idea that not only can things change-they should. In National
Federation she opined that the Court's decision "should not have
staying power" 359-a sentiment she had earlier employed in Ricci in
almost identical words. 360 In a potentially canonical dissent in Shelby
County, she closed with the following prophetic words: "The great men
who led the march from Selma to Montgomery and their call for the
passage of the Voting Rights Act foresaw progress even in Alabama.
'The arc of the moral universe is long,"' she quoted, '"but it bends
toward justice if there is a steadfast commitment to see the task
through to completion.' That commitment has been disserved by
today's decision."361

4.

Tone of Voice When Reading Dissents

Although the New York Times has described Ginsburg's tone as
impassioned when reading her dissents, 362 most of them were
delivered in her normal quiet, well-modulated voice. A CNN article
described Ginsburg's tone in Epic Systems as "forceful."363 However,
that tone emanated more from her language, which included phrases
such as "egregiously wrong," 364 and "destructive result,"3 65 rather
than her actual tone of voice. One of her friends agrees that her tone
became more vehement, noting "she [was] seeing that basic issues
she's fought so hard for are in jeopardy, and she is less bound by what
have been the conventions of the court."366

VII. CONCLUSION
The problem with engaging in these types of conversations from
the bench is that they challenge the very notion of the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter of disputes and, in the eyes of some, undermines
the authority of the Court. O'Donnell points out that "[w]hile a robust
dissenting tradition encourages the free exchange of ideas, the
Supreme Court unquestionably speaks most forcefully when it uses a
359. Nat'l. Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 590 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also used this exact phrase in Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
360. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 609 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
361. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 9:47-10:20, Part Two, Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/1296.
362. Greenhouse, supra note 281.
363. Joan Biskupic, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Takes Off the Gloves, CNN (Aug.
13, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/21/politics/ruth-baderginsburg-gloves-of£lindex.html.
364. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
365. Id. at 1645.
366. Greenhouse, supra note 281 (quoting Cynthia Fuchs Epstein).
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single, unanimous voice." 367
However, these continuing
conversations are important for the health of our democracy. The
lessons of dissent in Plessy, Korematsu, and others show that the
Justices have an obligation to speak not only to their colleagues on
these issues but to Congress and the broader public too. Moreover, a
dissent is not just for a future day. It is for the here and now. An oral
dissent can engage a broader audience than just the profession in the
conversation. A five- to ten-minute broadly accessible description of
the issues in the case and the reasons why the Justice is dissenting
engages the broader public in a dialogue.
As Guinier has noted, "oral dissents create salient moments of
democratic accountability when constitutional law meets
constitutional culture." 368 The judges are speaking in oral dissent.
Where the conversations go from there is up to their respective
audiences.

367. Michael O'Donnell, What's the Point of a Supreme Court Dissent?,
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/whatsthe-point-of-a-supreme-court-dissent/.
368. Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 54.
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